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SKILL.md:19- Finding
Sensitive Demographic Inference and Racialized Appearance Profiling
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This skill does not contain code or persistence, but it directs agents to make sensitive appearance-based judgments about ethnicity, age, and cosmetic procedures from photos without adequate safeguards.
Review before installing. This skill should not be used on private individuals or third-party images without consent, and its ethnicity/ancestry, age, cosmetic-history, and naturalness outputs should not be treated as factual or used for employment, insurance, healthcare, identity, moderation, or reputational decisions.
SKILL.md:19Sensitive Demographic Inference and Racialized Appearance Profiling
This content may contain harmful instructions that could cause physical harm if followed. CRITICAL: Review carefully before use.
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## 5. Forehead & Brow
### Botulinum Toxin (Botox / 肉毒素)
High-confidence indicators (in video/expression photos):
- Complete absence of forehead lines during brow elevation
- "Frozen" upper face with mobile lower face (the classic "Botox look")
The skill explicitly instructs the model to infer ethnicity or ancestry from a person's appearance and use that as an analytical baseline. Inferring sensitive attributes from images is dangerous because it invites profiling, is error-prone, and can produce discriminatory or demeaning outputs while lending false scientific legitimacy to protected-trait judgments.
The cross-region coherence step directs the model to decide whether facial features match a 'consistent genetic background,' including an example contrasting East Asian and Caucasian traits. This operationalizes sensitive-trait classification and compounds harm by tying cosmetic-surgery suspicion to racialized feature judgments, which can be both discriminatory and highly unreliable.
The required output template mandates reporting an 'ethnic baseline reference,' ensuring the sensitive-attribute inference is surfaced in final user-visible output rather than remaining incidental. This makes the harm more direct by normalizing race/ethnicity judgments as part of the product response and increasing the likelihood of discriminatory misuse or user distress.
The trigger list is broad enough to activate on common requests like '鉴定一下' or '看看有没有整', which can sweep in casual appearance-judgment prompts and route them to a highly sensitive biometric-inference skill. In context, this is risky because the skill performs sensitive trait and cosmetic-procedure inference from images, so over-triggering increases the chance of processing content that should be declined or handled by a safer generic image-analysis flow.
This skill is designed to judge whether a person in a photo has had cosmetic procedures and assign 'naturalness' assessments, but the reference provides no user-facing safeguards about privacy, consent, sensitivity, or the risk of making ungrounded inferences about a person's body and medical history. That omission increases the chance the agent will perform invasive appearance analysis on third parties, produce stigmatizing claims, or encourage harassment and non-consensual profiling.
The reference explicitly instructs the model to infer what is 'normal' from ethnicity-specific facial baselines, which pushes the skill toward race-based appearance classification without consent or reliable grounding. In a tool that already makes sensitive judgments about whether someone has had cosmetic work, this can amplify stereotyping, misclassification, and discriminatory outputs, especially for mixed ancestry or users whose ethnicity is unknown from images.
No suspicious patterns detected.