ClawHub
Back to skill

Security audit

AIFS - HTTP File system

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent AIFS cloud-storage helper, but it gives agents broad remote read, write, patch, and delete capability without enough user-control guidance.

Review before installing. Use this only when you intentionally want files sent to AIFS.space, avoid sensitive content, prefer least-privilege keys instead of admin keys, and confirm the target path/account before any write, patch, overwrite, or delete operation.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:34
Finding

Bearer API Key Exposed Through Process Command-Line Arguments

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:139
Finding

Unsafe JSON Construction Using Remotely Stored File Content

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (5)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The invocation text uses broad triggers such as 'persisting notes, documents, or data to the cloud' and 'cloud file storage,' which can match many common user intents and cause the skill to activate when the user did not explicitly ask to use AIFS. In this context, unintended activation is risky because the skill's core behavior is external transmission and remote file manipulation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to store, read, patch, and delete cloud-hosted files, but it does not require prominent user-facing confirmation that data will leave the local environment, persist remotely, and may be modified or deleted. The brief note 'Not to be used for any sensitive content' is insufficient because users may still unknowingly trigger external storage or destructive actions for ordinary requests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

This example sends authenticated requests to an external cloud storage service and demonstrates listing remote files. Even though the intent is functional documentation, it normalizes transferring metadata and interacting with third-party storage without embedding consent, minimization, or trust-boundary warnings, which increases the chance of unauthorized disclosure of user file names and structure.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

List Files

bash
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $AIFS_API_KEY" https://aifs.space/api/files

Returns: {"files": [{"path": "notes/todo.txt", "size": 1024, "modifiedAt": "..."}]}

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This example explicitly uploads session notes to a third-party service, creating a clear external transmission and persistence path for potentially sensitive conversational data. In skill context this is more dangerous because 'session notes' can easily contain private user information, and the example lacks mandatory sanitization, consent, retention, or confirmation controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 119)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Save
curl -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d "{\"path\":\"sessions/$(date +%Y-%m-%d).md\",\"content\":\"# Session Notes\\n...\"}" \
  https://aifs.space/api/write

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

This pattern reads existing remote content and writes back an appended log entry, which can exfiltrate accumulated content and overwrite cloud data in one workflow. In context it is riskier than a simple write because it encourages bulk retrieval plus retransmission of prior log contents, increasing exposure and the chance of unintended modification if the wrong file or account is targeted.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 145)May include surrounding context.

EXISTING=$(curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" "https://aifs.space/api/read?path=log.txt" | jq -r .content)

Append and write back

curl -X POST -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json"
-d "{"path":"log.txt","content":"$EXISTING\n$(date): New entry"}"
https://aifs.space/api/write

text

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.