T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:46- Finding
Persistent Device Fingerprinting for Correlation of Health Consultations
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is mostly a disclosed health-service connector, but it requires persistent device fingerprinting and links health consultations to that stable identifier without clear user consent.
Review this skill before installing if you are uncomfortable with persistent tracking. It instructs the agent to read a machine identifier, hostname, and username, hash them into a stable client ID, and send that ID with health consultation content to health.geeyo.com. Avoid using share_create for sensitive conversations unless you intend the conversation to be available through a share link.
SKILL.md:46Persistent Device Fingerprinting for Correlation of Health Consultations
The skill directs the agent to collect OS-level machine identifiers, hostname, and username to derive a stable cross-session client ID. Even though it says to hash the values before sending, this is still device fingerprinting for a health-related skill and is not necessary to answer acupoint questions; it enables persistent user/device tracking and encourages execution of local shell commands to access sensitive host data.
The skill omits a clear user-facing warning that it collects local machine fingerprint components to create a stable identifier. In a health consultation context, undisclosed persistent identification undermines informed consent and can link sensitive symptom history to the same device over time, increasing privacy risk even if the raw fingerprint is hashed.
The share_create feature allows publishing full conversation content via a shareable link, but the skill does not clearly warn that health-related messages may become accessible to anyone with the link. For a medical/wellness skill, this can expose sensitive personal information and create unintended disclosure if users assume sharing is private or internal.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -s -D - -X POST $BASE_URL/mcp \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Accept: application/json, text/event-stream" \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-03-26","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"my-agent","version":"1.0"}}}'
The example request includes symptom details in the message field and transmits them to a remote service, but the markdown does not warn users that health-related input will be sent over the network. For markdown files, user-facing documentation should disclose behaviors that may affect privacy or user data.
All user-facing instructional text in the file is written in Chinese, with no indication that another language is available or that the locale is intentionally constrained. The policy requires avoiding language or locale restrictions unless they are explicitly optional or justified.