T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:36- Finding
Publisher-Controlled Instruction and Output Routing
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a disclosed LYGO tool router, but it needs review because it steers agents toward publisher-controlled installs and mutable npx commands.
Install this only if you intentionally want an agent to prioritize the LYGO ecosystem. Do not allow automatic npx, ClawHub skill installs, stack CLI execution, LYGO_STACK_ROOT access, or LYGO_VAULT_ROOT access without explicit approval, and prefer pinned or otherwise verified package versions before running any install command.
SKILL.md:36Publisher-Controlled Instruction and Output Routing
SKILL.md:13Execution and Installation of Mutable Remote Dependencies
Suspicious Unicode normalization or mixed-script content
The skill explicitly instructs agents to read local files such as references/AGENT_CONTRACT.md, references/SECURITY.md, references/TOOLS_MANIFEST.json, and optionally files under $LYGO_STACK_ROOT, but it does not declare an explicit tool scope via permissions or allowed-tools. That mismatch can cause agents or hosting platforms to grant broader filesystem-read behavior than intended, increasing the risk of unintended local file access if the skill is mirrored into a sensitive environment.
Using 'npx clawhub@latest install deepseekoracle/lygo-tools-portal' pulls the latest package version at execution time, which creates a supply-chain risk because future compromised or malicious releases would be executed implicitly. Since this is an installation path for agents and users, the context makes the issue more dangerous: the skill is directly guiding consumers to run an unpinned remote package.
This second use of 'npx clawhub@latest install deepseekoracle/' repeats the same unpinned execution pattern, exposing agents to remote package substitution or malicious future releases. Because it is presented as the standard installation mechanism for additional skills, exploitation could propagate across the broader tool chain.
Suspicious Unicode normalization or mixed-script content
The intent phrases for the music portal include broad triggers like 'play music', 'free songs', and 'music portal', which overlap with ordinary user language. In an agent-routing context, overly broad triggers can cause unintended invocation of this skill, potentially redirecting user requests to external sites or tools the user did not explicitly ask to use.
The Haven Star Chart intent list contains very generic terms such as 'galaxy', 'nebula', 'cluster', and 'agent portal', which are likely to appear in benign conversation unrelated to this tool. In a routing manifest, such triggers can lead to accidental skill activation, context hijacking, or unintended navigation to external resources.
The install command uses npx clawhub@latest, which pulls whatever version is current at execution time rather than a reviewed, pinned release. If the upstream package is compromised or a breaking/malicious release is published, users and agents could execute attacker-controlled code during installation.
This manifest advertises npx clawhub@latest install ..., leaving package resolution to the current latest npm release at runtime. That creates a software supply-chain exposure where a compromised or malicious update can be executed directly by users following the manifest.
Using npx clawhub@latest in a published manifest makes installations non-reproducible and trusts the npm registry's future state. An attacker who gains control of the package or publishing pipeline could weaponize installs into arbitrary code execution.
The command references an unpinned latest package version, so execution depends on an external mutable source. That is dangerous because installation through npx executes package code immediately, amplifying the impact of any upstream compromise.
This install string relies on @latest, which is a mutable target and therefore weakens supply-chain integrity. Because users may copy-paste the manifest command directly, a malicious upstream release could convert documentation into an execution vector.
npx clawhub@latest delegates trust to the most recent published package at install time, not the version reviewed when this manifest was authored. That creates a classic package-supply-chain risk with potential arbitrary code execution on the installing host.
The mutable latest tag makes this installation instruction unsafe from a reproducibility and provenance standpoint. If the referenced npm package is hijacked, the manifest could funnel users into running malicious code under the guise of a normal skill install.
Invoking npx against clawhub@latest means the code executed is not fixed by the manifest and may change at any time. In a tool-routing skill that encourages installation of many related skills, this increases systemic supply-chain exposure across the ecosystem.
The command points to a mutable package tag and would execute package-provided code when run. That is dangerous because a compromised upstream package could affect every consumer of this manifest without any change to the manifest itself.
Several clawhub skill intents in this section are generic phrases like 'memory', 'workflow orchestrator', 'knowledge base', or 'persona', which can collide with everyday user requests. In an agent ecosystem, that raises the risk of unintended installation suggestions, incorrect routing, or externally influenced tool selection without clear user intent.
An unpinned npx package reference introduces a direct dependency on future package registry state. Since this manifest is effectively instructional code for operators and agents, an upstream compromise could produce broad arbitrary-code-execution risk.
This install instruction is vulnerable to supply-chain drift because @latest is not immutable. In practice, that means the command may execute code that was never reviewed by the manifest author or the downstream user.
Relying on the latest npm version at execution time is unsafe for a command intended to be copied and executed. Attackers frequently target package distribution channels, and npx will run the fetched package code directly.
The use of clawhub@latest creates a mutable trust dependency on an external registry entry. Because this file is a central manifest for routing to official tools, any compromised install path could mislead users into running malicious code with elevated trust.
This is a real supply-chain vulnerability: the package version is not pinned, yet the manifest encourages execution via npx. The combination of central discoverability plus direct execution increases the likelihood and blast radius of abuse if the upstream package is compromised.
The manifest's install command executes a package chosen by the moving latest tag instead of an immutable reviewed artifact. That undermines trust and can lead to arbitrary code execution through a malicious or hijacked release.
Because npx runs remote package code, leaving the package at @latest exposes users to future unreviewed releases. In a manifest that lists numerous install targets, this pattern repeats a high-risk supply-chain weakness across multiple entries.
This command is another instance of a mutable npx dependency that can silently change behavior over time. If exploited through a compromised npm publication, it could result in remote code execution on systems that trust and follow this manifest.
No suspicious patterns detected.