T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:7
- Finding
- Unpinned Remote Package Execution During Skill Migration## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 7-8 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party package execution **Risk Level**: Medium **Complete Code Snippet**: ```markdown > **Consolidated (Δ9 v2):** New installs → `lygo-champion-council`. This slug is legacy retention only. > `npx clawhub@latest install deepseekoracle/lygo-champion-council` ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented migration command uses `npx` to retrieve and execute the `latest` release of the external `clawhub` package. The `latest` tag is mutable, so the code executed in the future is not fixed to the version reviewed by this audit. The project does not specify an exact package version, enforce an integrity hash, or include the retrieved package for inspection. This creates a supply-chain trust boundary: executing the command delegates code execution to the current contents of a remote package registry. A compromised publisher account, registry, dependency chain, or malicious future release could alter the effective payload without any modification to this repository. The project does not invoke this command automatically. Exploitation requires a user or agent to follow the installation instruction. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the `clawhub` publication channel, a relevant maintainer account, or a transitive dependency used by a future release. 2. The compromised release becomes the target of the mutable `latest` tag. 3. A user follows the migration command in `SKILL.md`. 4. `npx` downloads and executes the affected package. 5. Malicious package lifecycle or runtime code executes with the permissions and environmental access of the invoking process. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution under the invoking user's privileges. Depending on that user's environment, the payload could read or modify accessible files, collect credentials or tokens exposed to the process, ...[truncated 367 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions - Replace `clawhub@latest` with an exact, previously audited package version. - Publish and verify a cryptographic checksum or signature for the installer and target package before execution. - Use package-manager lockfiles and integrity metadata where supported. - Review the pinned package, its lifecycle scripts, and its transitive dependency tree before recommending execution. - Prefer an installation process that downloads without immediately executing code, allowing validation before invocation. - Document the expected publisher identity, package version, digest, and verification procedure. - Update versions through an explicit review process rather than relying on a mutable distribution tag.