T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:17
- Finding
- Unpinned Third-Party Installation Artifacts## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 17-26 and 181-188 **Vulnerability Type**: Supply-chain risk from mutable, unverified dependencies **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code Lines 17-26: ```yaml - kind: brew tap: dedene/tap formula: kmi bins: [kmi] - kind: go package: github.com/dedene/kmi-irm-cli/cmd/kmi bins: [kmi] - kind: binary url: https://github.com/dedene/kmi-irm-cli/releases/latest bins: [kmi] ``` Lines 181-188: ```bash # macOS/Linux brew install dedene/tap/kmi # Windows - download from GitHub Releases # https://github.com/dedene/kmi-irm-cli/releases ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill defines installation methods that rely on mutable third-party sources without pinning an audited version, commit, artifact digest, or cryptographic signature. In particular: - The Go package does not specify a module version or immutable commit. - The binary source references the mutable `releases/latest` endpoint. - The custom Homebrew tap can update its formula and downloaded artifacts after this Skill has been reviewed. - No SHA-256 checksum, signature, provenance attestation, or verification procedure is provided. Consequently, the code eventually installed under the trusted `kmi` command name can differ from the code that existed when the Skill was audited. This creates a supply-chain boundary in which compromise of the upstream repository, release credentials, GitHub account, Homebrew tap, or artifact hosting process could introduce attacker-controlled executable code. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises an upstream publishing account, repository, release workflow, Homebrew tap, or associated artifact. 2. The attacker publishes a modified release, Go source revision, or Homebrew formula under the expected project identity. 3. A user or Agent follows the installation metadata or documented installa ...[truncated 1096 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin the CLI to a specific audited semantic version and, where possible, an immutable source commit. 2. Replace the mutable `releases/latest` URL with a version-specific direct artifact URL. 3. Publish SHA-256 checksums for every platform artifact and require checksum verification before installation or execution. 4. Sign release artifacts and document signature verification using a trusted mechanism such as Sigstore or GPG. 5. Pin the Go installation to an explicit version, for example `github.com/dedene/kmi-irm-cli/cmd/kmi@vX.Y.Z`. 6. Pin or otherwise verify the Homebrew formula and the artifact digest it installs. 7. Use protected release workflows, least-privilege publishing credentials, branch protection, and provenance attestations. 8. Update the Skill only after reviewing each new pinned release rather than automatically following mutable upstream content.