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Security audit

Repeated Games & Reputation

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a text-only strategy-analysis skill with no evident code execution, data access, persistence, or hidden behavior.

Reasonable to install if you want an advisory framework for repeated-game, cooperation, and reputation-system reasoning. Treat its outputs as strategic analysis rather than automatic authority to act in business, legal, financial, or relationship decisions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (1)

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
|---|---|
| [D] "We have a long relationship, so they won't defect" | The relationship's *length* doesn't matter; the **shadow of the future** does. If their discount factor is low (they're about to retire, the firm is being sold, they have alternative partners lined up), past relationship duration provides no protection. Run the δ check, not the nostalgia check. |
| [D] "Reputation will discipline them" | Only if the reputation system has all four pieces (observation, aggregation, persistence, manipulation resistance) and is actually consulted. Many "reputation matters" claims are wishful — the system is broken on one of the four pieces. |
| [D] Applying TFT in a noisy environment without forgiveness | Pure TFT under noise enters mutual-recrimination death spirals. If observation has error, use Generous TFT, Contrite TFT, or Pavlov. Recommending TFT without checking noise level is a documented failure. |
| [D] Using cooperation-by-default in a known finite-endpoint game | Backward induction: last round → defect dominates; second-to-last → both know this and defect; unraveling cascades to round one. Add uncertainty about endpoint or commitment devices. |
| [D] "Always-defect can't beat TFT, so cooperation is automatic" | Always-defect can't beat TFT head-to-head, but can dominate in a population without retaliators. Tournament context matters — don't generalize from two-player simulation to a marketplace with unknown counterparties. |
| [D] Designing a reputation system without manipulation resistance | A gameable system creates worse outcomes than no system, because the gamed signal substitutes for direct due diligence. Test every reputation system against adversarial gaming before deployment. |
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding
Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.