Install
openclaw skills install @deciqai/probabilistic-thinkingActivate when: user says 'what are the odds,' 'base rate,' 'Bayesian update,' 'calibration,' or 'what's the probability'; user is making a forecast or estimating a conversion/close/hire/outcome probability; someone claims 'I'm 90% sure' without any evidence grounding; a vivid story is being used in place of a prior frequency; team is treating an uncertain outcome as binary will/won't. Do NOT activate when: the problem has a deterministic answer from its inputs (math, well-defined engineering); the question is about identity, ethics, or meaning rather than fact.
openclaw skills install @deciqai/probabilistic-thinkingMost reasoning is binary: will it happen, or won't it? That framing discards the most useful information — the degree of confidence — and produces predictions that cannot be checked, updated, or scored. Probabilistic thinking replaces binary with calibrated probability estimates: numbers anchored in base rates, updated with evidence, and scored after the fact. Rooted in Bayes (1763), Knight's risk-vs-uncertainty distinction (1921), and Tetlock's empirical work showing calibration is a trainable skill.
Composable neighbors: first-principles · occams-razor · second-order-thinking · inversion · regret-minimization · expected-value-and-kelly. This skill is the upstream input the others depend on — the probability estimate here feeds EV-Kelly, calibrates inversion's failure-path weights, and gives second-order's hops their confidence decay.
Use when reasoning about an uncertain outcome (forecast, diagnosis, pipeline conversion, hire, deal close, geopolitical event); when binary "will/won't" predictions are being made; when a vivid story is replacing a base rate; when "I'm 90% sure" appears with no calibration evidence.
When NOT to use: deterministic problems (math, well-defined engineering); pure Knightian uncertainty with no usable base rate (give a range + humility statement instead); decision is robust across all likely probabilities; question is identity/ethics/meaning (→ regret-minimization).
In Coach mode, respond one step at a time. Each [WAIT] is a hard stop — output only that step's question, then stop.
[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]
[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]
[WAIT — do not advance until user responds]
Run the Probability Estimate. Base rate first, then evidence, then update, then calibration check.
Question (precise): <outcome, deadline>
Base rate: <reference class> → <fraction> (source, n=)
Evidence: <signal> ↑/↓ strong/moderate/weak [repeat per signal]
Bayesian shift: net <↑/↓ to X%> — rationale in one paragraph
Estimate: <point %> | 80% CI: <%–%> | Knightian caveat if needed
Next evidence: <observable> → <% if X> / <% if Y>
Calibration log: date | question | resolution criteria | Brier score after
→ Method in Action: Tetlock, IARPA, and the Good Judgment Project (2011–2015)
| Domain | Base rate source | Classic failure |
|---|---|---|
| Medical | Disease prevalence in population | Base-rate neglect → false positives |
| Sales | Conversion-by-stage history | Anchoring on preferred deal |
| Legal | Crime/suspect-pool frequencies | Prosecutor's fallacy |
| Product/startup | Cohort retention, vintage distributions | Survivorship bias |
→ Primary sources: references/sources.md
[D] = designed upfront | [O] = observed in real use. [O] entries are more valuable.
| Fake move | Reality |
|---|---|
| [D] Base-rate neglect | Reaching for a vivid story while ignoring the prior frequency of the outcome class. Always anchor in a base rate first; updates come from there. |
| [D] Confusing P(evidence | outcome) with P(outcome | evidence) (prosecutor's fallacy) | A test triggering on 99% of cases of a rare disease will, in a low-prevalence population, produce mostly false positives. Bayes' theorem connects them; they are not interchangeable. |
| [D] Treating "very likely" as a binary | "I'm 90% sure" with no calibration history and no number for "what would make it 50%" is a vibe, not an estimate. |
| [D] Confusing risk with uncertainty (Knight 1921) | An actuarial-table problem and a geopolitical-forecasting problem differ in kind. Inventing a precise number for genuine Knightian uncertainty manufactures false confidence. |
| [D] One-shot probability fallacy | "The probability of this event is X" implicitly invokes a reference class. Name it; otherwise the probability is undefined. |
| [D] Survivorship bias in base-rate construction | Reasoning from winners without including losers gives an inflated base rate. The reference class must include the failures. |
| [D] Anchoring on the first number that appears | Even random numbers shift estimates (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). Notice when you are anchoring on the latest news rather than the base rate. |
| [D] Under-updating on strong evidence | Stubbornly holding the prior when new information is high-quality. Bayes says update; ignoring evidence is anti-Bayesian. |
| [D] Over-updating on weak evidence | Letting noisy or single-source data dominate. Superforecasters' edge is smaller updates more often, not bigger ones. |
| [D] Pseudo-precision | "73.2% probability" when inputs justify nothing tighter than "60–80%." Match precision to evidence strength. |
| → Add [O] entries here after each real use — paste the actual failure pattern | What went wrong and why |
Part of deciqAI Knowledge Skills — open-source thinking skills that make rigor executable for AI agents. Built by deciqAI · https://deciqai.com · Contributions welcome — see the template at the repo root.