Feishu Bitable Query

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 11, 2026 · 4:37 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Feishu Bitable query helper that uses local Feishu credentials to read table records, with no evidence of hidden persistence, destructive actions, or unrelated data exfiltration.

Install only if you intend agents to query Feishu Bitable data using the Feishu app credentials stored in ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json. Treat results as organizational data, and prefer explicit app tokens, table IDs, filters, and field selections so the agent retrieves only the records needed.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Trigger Abuse: Overly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
• MCP Least Privilege: Underdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (5)

Lp3

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: The skill invokes a Python script that performs network-backed Feishu queries, but the manifest declares no explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. Without allowed-tools or permissions metadata, an agent may activate this skill without clear policy enforcement, increasing the chance of unintended external data access.

Vague Triggers

Medium

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: The activation text is broad enough to match many ordinary data-query requests, which can cause the skill to trigger in contexts where the user did not explicitly intend Feishu Bitable access. Because the skill can query remote records and use stored credentials, overbroad activation increases the risk of unnecessary or privacy-impacting data retrieval.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: The skill states that credentials are automatically read from ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json, but it provides no user-facing warning or consent boundary around secret use. This is dangerous because the skill can silently leverage locally stored Feishu app credentials to access organizational data, especially when combined with broad activation criteria.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 88% confidence
• Finding: This code loads appId and appSecret from a local config file and immediately sends them in an HTTP request to obtain a tenant access token. Although network access is inherent to the tool's purpose, there is no explicit disclosure in the docstring, comments, or runtime output that local credentials will be read and transmitted for authentication.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low

• Confidence: 88% confidence
• Finding: This markdown file is entirely written in Chinese, starting with the title at L01, and does not state that the reference is intended only for Chinese-speaking users or a China-specific deployment context. Under the language/locale policy, forcing a specific language without opt-in or justification can be a policy violation.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.