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Security audit

org-memory

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This appears to be a legitimate org-mode memory extension, but it has review-worthy risks around persistent raw memory being reloaded into prompts and write tools that can escape the intended workspace.

Install only if you intentionally want the agent to keep durable org-mode memory. Review memory.org and daily notes periodically, avoid saving secrets or untrusted instructions, and restrict the memory workspace and org binary configuration. The publisher should add path-containment validation and safer handling for loaded memory before this is treated as low risk.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Error
Location
plugin/index.ts:89
Finding

Persistent Prompt Injection Through Untrusted Memory Content

Content
View full analysis
\n${memoryOrg}\n`); } const today = todayStr(); const yesterday = yesterdayStr(); const todayContent = await readOrgFile( join(cfg.dir, "daily", `${today}.org`), MAX_FILE_BYTES, ); if (todayContent) { parts.push( `\n${todayContent}\n`, ); } const yesterdayContent = await readOrgFile( join(cfg.dir, "daily", `${yesterday}.org`), MAX_FILE_BYTES, ); if (yesterdayContent) { parts.push( `\n${yesterdayContent}\n`, ); } return { prependContext: `\n${parts.join("\n")}\n`, }; ``` The affected memory can be populated through mutation tools such as `org_memory_add_note`, `org_memory_append`, and `org_memory_roam_upsert`. For example, `org_memory_add_note` accepts caller-controlled text and a caller-selected file: ```ts parameters: Type.Object({ text: Type.String({ description: "Note text (becomes the headline title)" }), file: Type.Optional( Type.String({ description: "Filename relative to the workspace dir (default: inboxFile)", }), ), }), async execute(_id, params) { const typed = params as { text: string; file?: string }; const args = buildAddNoteArgs(cfg, typed); try { const { stdout } = await runOrg(cfg.orgBin, args); ``` ### Technical Analysis The `before_agent_start` hook reads `memory.org` and recent daily notes and inserts their contents verbatim into the agent's prepended session context. The stored content is pla ...[truncated 1971 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
plugin/lib.ts:129
Finding

Workspace Escape Through Unvalidated Relative File Paths

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (9)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The top-level description says the skill persists the agent's own memory, but it does not clearly warn users that activating the skill can cause writes to both the agent memory workspace and, through inherited bare shortcuts from org-cli, the user's workspace as well. In a memory/persistence skill, ambiguous disclosure increases the risk of users enabling it without understanding that durable notes and graph data may be created or modified across multiple stores.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The injected instructions explicitly encourage broad retention of 'ambient facts about the user,' working notes, and permanent knowledge into the agent's org workspace. That creates a natural-language privacy and data retention risk: the agent may persist sensitive personal or contextual information more aggressively than users expect, and those notes are then reloaded into future sessions, compounding exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The before_agent_start hook automatically reads memory.org plus today/yesterday daily notes and injects their raw contents into the agent prompt context. That creates an implicit disclosure channel for potentially sensitive persisted data without per-session consent, minimization, or any user-visible warning at the moment of exposure. In a memory plugin, this behavior is functional, but it still increases the risk of oversharing prior notes, secrets, or unrelated user data to the model every session.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The document explicitly instructs the agent to persist 'ambient facts,' daily logs, entity updates, and permanent memory across sessions, and to auto-load memory.org plus recent daily files at session start. That creates a real session-persistence channel where sensitive user data, prior prompts, or attacker-planted content can be retained and reintroduced into future sessions, increasing the risk of privacy leakage and prompt/data poisoning.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/memory-architecture.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

md
**`memory.org`** — your permanent memory. Curated, concise, always loaded at session start. Contains who the user is, active projects, lessons learned, conventions, and anything needed every session. Keep it tight — move detail into entity nodes and keep memory.org as a summary with links.

**`daily/YYYY-MM-DD.org`** — raw daily logs. What happened, decisions made, ambient facts captured, things learned. Working notes, not curated. Write freely.

**Entity nodes** (`roam/*.org`) — structured roam nodes for people, projects, concepts. Tagged, linked, and queryable on demand.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
77% confidence
Finding

The tool executes the external org binary with a full-text search query against the agent workspace, which is a subprocess operation over potentially sensitive stored data. Although subprocess use is expected for an org-cli integration, there is no visible user-facing disclosure in this tool implementation that search requests are being executed via an external command over persisted memory.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
77% confidence
Finding

This manifest file describes the skill as an "Agent-memory extension" that persists knowledge and daily notes, but it does not specify when or under what exact conditions the extension should activate. In a manifest context, the lack of explicit trigger scope or exclusion conditions can make invocation behavior ambiguous.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Unpinned Dependencies

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
40% confidence
Finding

Dependencies lack version pinning, allowing potential malicious package updates. Consider pinning versions.

Content

Scanner excerpt · plugin/package.json (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

json
"test": "node --test --experimental-strip-types index.test.ts"
  },
  "dependencies": {
    "@sinclair/typebox": "^0.34.48"
  },
  "devDependencies": {
    "@types/node": "^22.10.0"

Unpinned Dependencies

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
40% confidence
Finding

Dependencies lack version pinning, allowing potential malicious package updates. Consider pinning versions.

Content

Scanner excerpt · plugin/package.json (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

json
"@sinclair/typebox": "^0.34.48"
  },
  "devDependencies": {
    "@types/node": "^22.10.0"
  }
}