T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:81- Finding
Unpinned Dependencies and Mutable Remote Source Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 81–94; related dependency metadata at line 16 and upgrade instructions at lines 406–407
Vulnerability Type: Software supply-chain exposure through mutable remote sources and unpinned dependencies
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Snippet:
bash git clone https://github.com/ResearAI/AutoFigure-Edit.git cd /home/davidzhao/.openclaw/workspace/skills/scientific-drawing-skill pip install -r requirements.txt pip install torch torchvision --index-url https://download.pytorch.org/whl/cu118 pip install transformers datasets accelerate pip install opencv-python pillow scikit-image pip install lxml svgwrite svgpathtools pip install flask flask-corsThe update instructions also execute an unconstrained dependency upgrade:
bash cd /home/davidzhao/.openclaw/workspace/skills/scientific-drawing-skill pip install -r requirements.txt --upgradeTechnical Analysis
The installation process clones the default branch of an external Git repository without selecting a reviewed commit, signed tag, or verified release artifact. Consequently, the downloaded implementation can change after this skill has been audited.
The documented
pipcommands also omit exact versions and cryptographic hashes. The referencedrequirements.txtis not present in the audited project, so its contents and transitive dependencies cannot be reviewed. Python package installation may execute package build backends and installation hooks. A compromised upstream repository, package release, account, or transitive dependency could therefore introduce executable code during installation.This combines mutable remote payload retrieval with insecure dependency management. HTTPS protects data in transit but does not establish that the current upstream content is the same content that was previously reviewed.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the referenced reposito ...[truncated 1116 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the external repository to a reviewed full commit hash or a cryptographically signed release tag.
- Record and verify the expected commit identity before installation.
- Include the implementation and dependency manifest in the auditable project rather than relying on undocumented remote state.
- Pin every direct and transitive dependency to an exact version.
- Generate a lockfile and require package hashes, such as through
pip install --require-hashes. - Remove unconstrained
--upgradeinstructions from normal installation and maintenance procedures. - Use an isolated virtual environment or container with minimal filesystem and network permissions.
- Perform dependency vulnerability, provenance, and package-name checks before publishing updates.
- Prefer trusted package indexes explicitly and prevent fallback to unintended indexes.
