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Security audit

Everclaw — Inference You Own

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

Everclaw appears to be a real Morpheus/OpenClaw inference skill, but it includes broad wallet, persistence, network exposure, and unverified remote-code execution behavior that should be reviewed before installation.

Review before installing. Prefer a manual clone and inspect scripts instead of curl-to-bash, disable or patch unattended nuclear reinstall, bind services to localhost, use your own API keys, keep only limited funds in any agent wallet, avoid unlimited token approvals, and understand that the skill may install persistent launchd services and modify OpenClaw configuration.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Findings (8)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
scripts/gateway-guardian.sh:263
Finding

Persistent watchdog automatically downloads and executes a mutable remote script

Content
View full analysis
> "$LOG_FILE" 2>&1 || nuclear_rc=$? if [[ "$nuclear_rc" -ne 0 ]]; then log "Step 4: Nuclear reinstall script exited with code $nuclear_rc." return 1 fi ``` The recovery chain invokes it automatically: ```bash restart_all_steps() { do_graceful_restart && return 0 do_hard_restart && return 0 do_kickstart && return 0 do_nuclear_reinstall && return 0 ``` ```bash case "$ERROR_CLASS" in billing) handle_billing_exhaustion ;; transient|timeout|unknown) log "ESCALATING: Error class '$ERROR_CLASS' — restarting may help." restart_all_steps exit $? ;; esac ``` ### Technical Analysis The persistent guardian retrieves the current contents of `https://clawd.bot/install.sh` and sends them directly to Bash. The effective code is not part of the reviewed package and can change at any time. No version pin, checksum, digital signature, or local inspection step protects this execution. This is more dangerous than a documented one-line installer because the operation can occur without contemporaneous user approval. The guardian classifies unknown or transient provider failures as recoverable and eventually reaches the remote reinstall after local recovery mechanisms fail. ### Attack Path 1. The guardian runs periodically through its persistent service. 2. An attacker or outag ...[truncated 830 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
scripts/install-with-deps.sh:279
Finding

Installation workflow executes mutable third-party scripts without integrity verification

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

other

Warning
Location
scripts/bootstrap-everclaw.mjs:42
Finding

Bootstrap enrollment transmits a stable device fingerprint derived from host identifiers

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/bootstrap-everclaw.mjs:185
Finding

Bootstrap API credential is written without explicit restrictive file permissions

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/bootstrap-gateway.mjs:89
Finding

Untrusted credentials and configuration values are interpolated into shell commands

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/everclaw-wallet.mjs:250
Finding

Wallet swaps disable slippage protection and approvals default to unlimited allowance

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
scripts/install.sh:31
Finding

Installer downloads executable releases without cryptographic verification and removes quarantine metadata

Content
View full analysis
/dev/null || true fi # Make binaries executable chmod +x "$INSTALL_DIR/proxy-router" 2>/dev/null || true chmod +x "$INSTALL_DIR/mor-cli" 2>/dev/null || true ``` ### Technical Analysis The installer resolves the moving `latest` release, downloads the selected executable, marks it executable, and removes macOS quarantine metadata. It does not verify a cryptographic digest, signed manifest, provenance attestation, or publisher signature. Checking that a legacy artifact is structurally a ZIP file does not establish authenticity. Removing quarantine further suppresses a platform control intended to warn users about downloaded executable content. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the upstream repository, release account, or distribution path. 2. A malicious executable is published under a matching release-asset name. 3. The installer resolves it as the latest release and downloads it. 4. The installer marks it executable and removes quarantine attributes. 5. The proxy is subsequently started directly or through a persistent service. 6. The malicious binary executes with access to Morpheus configuration ...[truncated 350 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
scripts/install.sh:164
Finding

Wallet-backed proxy and management services bind to all network interfaces by default

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (567)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Piping a remote script directly into bash executes unaudited code from a network location with no review step, making compromise of the domain, CDN, redirect, or transport path immediately equivalent to arbitrary code execution on the user's machine. In this project context, the installer is also described as performing dependency installation and bootstrap configuration, which amplifies the blast radius by enabling persistent system changes and credential handling.

Content

Scanner excerpt · CHANGELOG.md (reported line 9)May include surrounding context.

md
### Added
- **Guided Installer** (`scripts/install-with-deps.sh`)
  - One-line install: `curl -fsSL https://get.everclaw.xyz | bash`
  - Automatic dependency detection (curl, git, Node.js, npm, Homebrew, OpenClaw)
  - Platform-specific install commands (macOS, Ubuntu, Fedora, Arch)
  - `--check-only` flag to verify environment

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

This is a direct remote script fetch-and-execute pattern from a project-controlled domain. It creates classic supply-chain risk: DNS, hosting, CDN, or server compromise can immediately lead to arbitrary code execution on user machines during installation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

One-Line Install (Recommended)

bash
curl -fsSL https://get.everclaw.xyz | bash

This guided installer:

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The | bash chaining pattern removes the user's opportunity to inspect downloaded content before execution and is a common hallmark of unsafe bootstrap flows. In this skill's context—persistent services, system changes, and wallet-related setup—the blast radius of a malicious installer is substantial.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

One-Line Install (Recommended)

bash
curl -fsSL https://get.everclaw.xyz | bash

This guided installer:

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The OpenClaw prerequisite uses the same remote execution pattern, extending trust to another unaudited bootstrap path during setup. Because this skill later handles automation, networking, and wallet-adjacent workflows, compromise of prerequisite installers has serious downstream impact.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

md
| **Homebrew** (macOS) | `/bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.sh)"` | Package manager |
| **Node.js** (v18+) | `brew install node` | Bootstrap scripts, proxy |
| **Git** | `brew install git` | Skill installation |
| **OpenClaw** | `curl -fsSL https://get.openclaw.ai \| bash` | Agent runtime |

**Quick check:** Run `curl -fsSL https://get.everclaw.xyz | bash -s -- --check-only` to verify your environment.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Even the 'check-only' variant still executes remote code locally, just with different arguments, so the same arbitrary code execution risk remains. Users may be misled into thinking it is a harmless validation step when it still trusts live network content.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 51)May include surrounding context.

md
| **Git** | `brew install git` | Skill installation |
| **OpenClaw** | `curl -fsSL https://get.openclaw.ai \| bash` | Agent runtime |

**Quick check:** Run `curl -fsSL https://get.everclaw.xyz | bash -s -- --check-only` to verify your environment.

### After Installation

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The declared description focuses on AI inference routing, Morpheus/Claude model access, proxy/gateway bootstrap, auth/session management, payment/wallet functions, agent registry reading, and always-on process orchestration. The actual code does none of those things. Instead, it reads a local markdown security log file and analyzes security events for reporting purposes. This is a materially different primary purpose and introduces capabilities—security log analysis and threat summarization—not represented in the declared description. No evidence in the code supports the claimed inference, networking, wallet, payment, registry, or restart/router capabilities.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The description promises an AI inference/router stack with Morpheus network integration, fallback to Claude, payment and staking features, proxy behavior, retries, and always-on orchestration. The actual code does none of that. Its sole purpose is to audit Clawdbot security posture by checking directory/file permissions, whether config is in cloud-sync folders, gateway authentication/bind settings, Telegram DM/group policies, and SSH hardening. It also optionally auto-fixes chmod-based permission issues. This is a materially different primary purpose and introduces undeclared local system inspection/modification capabilities, so the description does not accurately represent the code chunk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The code chunk does not implement AI inference, model routing, Morpheus/Claude fallback behavior, API gateway bootstrap, proxying, session management, auth rotation, wallet/payment functions, launchd persistence, or agent registry access. Instead, it implements a standalone prompt-guard security analyzer. While the declared description briefly mentions 'bundled security skills,' that is only a minor supporting phrase within a much broader inference/router product description and does not accurately represent this code chunk’s actual primary behavior. Therefore this is a clear description-behavior mismatch.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The supplied code does not implement AI inference routing, Morpheus network access, Claude fallback, model proxying, wallet/payment handling, DIEM monitoring, session management, launchd restarts, or agent registry reading. Its primary purpose is entirely different: a client for a distributed prompt-threat intelligence network. This is a material description-versus-behavior mismatch, not just an omitted implementation detail.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The declared description covers a large, multi-feature inference infrastructure and operational toolkit. This code chunk does not implement that overall functionality; it only performs one narrow task: send a prompt through a local API using an existing active session and auth cookie. It does support Morpheus inference for multiple listed models and relies on session-based routing headers, which is directionally related to the description, but the primary declared capabilities—especially default GLM-5 routing, Claude fallback, retries, monitoring, recovery, payments, wallet/registry features, and always-on management—are absent from this code. Because the chunk’s actual behavior is much narrower than the declared purpose and does not evidence several central claimed capabilities, this is a description-behavior mismatch.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The description presents a full-featured inference/router skill with many active operational capabilities. The actual code chunk is a single diagnose.sh utility whose role is to audit configuration and infrastructure health for an existing Everclaw/Morpheus setup. It parses JSON config files, verifies provider names and fallback chains, checks auth-profile coverage, queries local health endpoints, inspects active sessions and balances, tests gateway reachability, and performs one live inference probe. Those actions are consistent with a diagnostic/support script, but not with the declared primary purpose of providing and operating the inference stack itself. The script does access resources broadly related to the declared ecosystem (OpenClaw/Morpheus configs, local services, Morpheus API), so it is not unrelated; however, its actual behavior is materially narrower and different in kind from the claimed capabilities. Therefore this is a clear description-behavior mismatch.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The declared description presents a broad, feature-rich inference and automation platform with decentralized routing, payments, monitoring, self-healing, and model-selection logic. The supplied code chunk is much narrower: it is an entrypoint/bootstrap script for a container. Its concrete behaviors are limited to printing startup info, creating/copying config and template files, creating workspace directories, starting a background Morpheus proxy script if available, and launching the OpenClaw gateway. While starting a Morpheus proxy and OpenClaw gateway is directionally related to the declared system, this code does not itself implement or demonstrate most of the specifically claimed capabilities, and its primary purpose is container initialization/orchestration rather than inference routing or decentralized-network logic. Therefore the description materially overstates what this code chunk actually does.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The declared description is about AI inference infrastructure and model routing on Morpheus with Claude fallback, including auth rotation, proxying, payment/wallet features, monitoring, and agent registry capabilities. The supplied code does none of that. Instead, it is an ecosystem repository maintenance script whose primary purpose is to push the current Git commit to multiple remotes, verify synchronization status, inspect a SmartAgent repository, optionally update a local clone, and emit a JSON status file. This is a materially different primary purpose and includes undeclared capabilities related to source-control automation and repository synchronization.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The declared description is about decentralized AI inference, model routing, proxying, retries, monitoring, payments, wallet management, and always-on agent infrastructure. The supplied code does none of that. Instead, it performs repository maintenance/security remediation: cloning GitHub repos, rewriting full commit history to scrub sensitive strings, and force-pushing the rewritten history. This is a materially different primary purpose and introduces undeclared capabilities affecting source-control history and remote repositories. Therefore the description does not accurately represent the code chunk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The declared description is about decentralized AI inference, model routing, gateway/proxy bootstrapping, session/error handling, payments, and agent discovery. The supplied code does none of that. Instead, it performs repository maintenance: cloning GitHub repos under a specific account, scanning for particular strings, editing files with sed, removing a JSON file, and committing/pushing those changes. This is a materially different primary purpose and introduces undeclared capabilities involving source repository access and modification. Therefore the description does not accurately represent the code.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The declared description presents a full-featured inference platform/router with many runtime capabilities: model routing to Morpheus, Claude fallback logic, token staking/recycling, error classification, auth rotation, DIEM monitoring, circuit breakers, launchd persistence, wallet/payment support, and ERC-8004 registry access. This code chunk does not implement those behaviors. Instead, it is an installer/bootstrap script whose primary purpose is environment setup: checking for dependencies, optionally installing them, cloning/updating the EverClaw repo, bootstrapping a starter key, and optionally launching another installer for a proxy-router. Some setup steps are plausibly related to the declared product, but the actual behavior of this chunk is materially different from the declared primary purpose and includes undeclared installation/system-modification capabilities. Therefore this chunk is a mismatch.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The description presents a full-featured inference and automation system, but the supplied code chunk only performs installation/bootstrap tasks for Morpheus binaries and local configuration. Some setup elements loosely align with the description (Morpheus install, model config, starter key bootstrap), but the actual code does not implement most of the advertised behavior and especially does not show Claude fallback, proxy/router runtime features, monitoring/recovery systems, payment functionality, registry access, or macOS persistence features. This is a material description-to-behavior mismatch because the primary purpose of the code chunk is installation, not operation of the claimed feature set.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The code chunk does not implement or support the declared Morpheus-based AI inference/router functionality. Instead, it is an unrelated maintenance/audit shell script for checking whether an OpenClaw project is safe to update, including license and dependency checks. This is a materially different primary purpose from decentralized inference routing, model access, payment handling, session management, or agent registry reading. Therefore the description does not accurately represent the supplied code.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

There is a strong mismatch between the declared description and the actual code. The description focuses on AI inference routing, model access, decentralized network integration, payments, wallet management, proxying, retries, monitoring, and self-healing infrastructure. The supplied code does none of that. Instead, it implements a security-oriented git pre-push hook for detecting personal data and credential-like strings in code changes and preventing pushes when violations are found. This is a materially different primary purpose and introduces undeclared capabilities related to repository scanning and push blocking. While the broad description mentions 'bundled security skills,' that is too vague to accurately represent this specific code’s behavior, especially since the dominant declared purpose is AI inference infrastructure rather than git-based PII protection.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The declared description and the actual code have entirely different primary purposes. The description advertises a complex AI inference/router platform with decentralized-network access, model routing, retries, payments, wallet management, and service supervision. The code does none of that. Instead, it implements a local security scanning utility for detecting PII/secrets in content and git history using regex and JSON-configured patterns. This is not a supporting subcomponent of the declared functionality; it is an unrelated security tool with separate inputs, outputs, and behavior. Therefore this is a clear material mismatch.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The code chunk implements a narrow subset of the declared ecosystem: Morpheus session lifecycle management via local API calls. It maps model names to IDs, reads credentials from ~/.cookie, and POSTs to localhost endpoints to open or close sessions, plus lists active sessions. While this is related to Morpheus and model access, it does not implement the primary advertised behavior of an open-source inference router, fallback orchestration, monitoring, self-healing, payment tooling, or always-on agent infrastructure. The description substantially overstates what this code chunk actually does, so the description does not accurately represent the supplied code.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The code chunk does not implement AI inference, model routing, Claude fallback, Morpheus gateway bootstrap, proxying, retry/session management, circuit breaking, launchd persistence, x402 payments, or ERC-8004 registry reading. Instead, its primary purpose is wallet-backed token swapping to acquire MOR. While obtaining MOR could be tangentially related to using the Morpheus ecosystem, this script is a distinct blockchain trading utility and a materially different capability from the declared inference/router platform. Therefore the description does not accurately represent this code chunk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 4)May include surrounding context.

md
---
name: everclaw
version: 2026.3.6
description: Open-source first AI inference — GLM-5 as default, Claude as fallback only. Own your inference forever via the Morpheus decentralized network. Stake MOR tokens, access GLM-5, GLM-4.7 Flash, Kimi K2.5, and 30+ models with persistent inference by recycling staked MOR. Open-source first model router routes all tiers to Morpheus by default — Claude only kicks in as an escape hatch when needed. Includes Morpheus API Gateway bootstrap for zero-config startup, OpenAI-compatible proxy with auto-session management, automatic retry with fresh sessions, OpenAI-compatible error classification to prevent cooldown cascades, multi-key auth rotation v2 with proactive DIEM balance monitoring and reactive 402 watchdog, Gateway Guardian v5 with direct curl inference probes (eliminates Signal spam), proactive Venice DIEM credit monitoring, circuit breaker for stuck sub-agents, nuclear self-healing restart, always-on proxy-router with launchd auto-restart, smart session archiver, three-shift cyclic execution engine (v2 with 15-minute execution loops), 24/7 always-on power configuration for macOS, bundled security skills, zero-dependency wallet management via macOS Keychain, x402 payment client for agent-to-agent USDC payments, and ERC-8004 agent registry reader for discovering trustless agents on Base.
homepage: https://everclaw.com
metadata:
  openclaw:

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The file contains hidden agent-directed instructions inside comments and operational prose telling agents exactly how to set up and modify local configuration. Hidden or agent-targeted instructions are dangerous because they can influence automated behavior without being obvious to end users performing a casual review.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 67)May include surrounding context.

md
tags: ["inference", "everclaw", "morpheus", "mor", "decentralized", "ai", "blockchain", "base", "persistent", "fallback", "guardian", "security", "three-shifts", "task-planning"]
---

<!-- ─── AGENT INSTRUCTIONS (read by OpenClaw agents) ─────────────── -->

## 🤖 Agent Setup Instructions

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The documentation recommends installing OpenClaw via curl-pipe-bash from a remote URL. Executing unauthenticated or unreviewed remote scripts directly in a shell is a well-known supply-chain and remote-code-execution risk.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 138)May include surrounding context.

md
| **Homebrew** (macOS) | `/bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Homebrew/install/HEAD/install.sh)"` | Package manager |
| **Node.js** (v18+) | `brew install node` | Bootstrap scripts, proxy |
| **Git** | `brew install git` | Skill installation |
| **OpenClaw** | `curl -fsSL https://get.openclaw.ai \| bash` | Agent runtime |

### Quick Check

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.dangerous_exec, suspicious.env_credential_access, suspicious.exposed_secret_literal (+3 more)

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
scripts/bootstrap-everclaw.mjs:154

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
scripts/bootstrap-gateway.mjs:98

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
scripts/coingecko-x402.mjs:28

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
scripts/everclaw-deps.mjs:212

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
scripts/everclaw-wallet.mjs:54

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
scripts/setup.mjs:202

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
scripts/x402-client.mjs:88

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical
Code
suspicious.env_credential_access
Location
scripts/morpheus-proxy.mjs:21

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical
Code
suspicious.env_credential_access
Location
scripts/x402-client.mjs:46

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
scripts/bootstrap-gateway.mjs:315

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
scripts/everclaw-wallet.mjs:123

Install source points to URL shortener or raw IP.

Warn
Code
suspicious.install_untrusted_source
Location
templates/flavors/morpheusclaw/cron-jobs.json:22

Install source points to URL shortener or raw IP.

Warn
Code
suspicious.install_untrusted_source
Location
templates/openclaw-config-linux.json:49

Install source points to URL shortener or raw IP.

Warn
Code
suspicious.install_untrusted_source
Location
templates/openclaw-config-mac.json:47

Sensitive-looking file read is paired with a network send.

Warn
Code
suspicious.potential_exfiltration
Location
scripts/morpheus-proxy.mjs:84

Prompt-injection style instruction pattern detected.

Warn
Code
suspicious.prompt_injection_instructions
Location
prompt-guard/blog/how-i-secured-my-ai-agent.md:12

Prompt-injection style instruction pattern detected.

Warn
Code
suspicious.prompt_injection_instructions
Location
prompt-guard/README.md:34

Prompt-injection style instruction pattern detected.

Warn
Code
suspicious.prompt_injection_instructions
Location
prompt-guard/SKILL.md:30