nanoclaw-traffic-guardian

NanoClaw runtime traffic monitoring baseline for host-side proxy inspection with container-safe MCP and IPC status surfaces.

This is a baseline specification skill. It intentionally does not ship a proxy or runtime implementation yet.

Vercel Skills Installation

Install with the Vercel Skills CLI for this harness:

bash

npx skills add prompt-security/clawsec --skill nanoclaw-traffic-guardian -a openclaw -y

Release Artifact Verification

For standalone installs, verify the signed release manifest before trusting SKILL.md, skill.json, or the archive. The skill.json file is the package metadata/SBOM source, and the release pipeline signs checksums.json with the ClawSec release key.

bash

set -euo pipefail

SKILL_NAME="nanoclaw-traffic-guardian"
VERSION="0.0.1-beta5"
REPO="prompt-security/clawsec"
TAG="${SKILL_NAME}-v${VERSION}"
BASE="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${TAG}"
ZIP_NAME="${SKILL_NAME}-v${VERSION}.zip"
TMP_DIR="$(mktemp -d)"
trap 'rm -rf "$TMP_DIR"' EXIT

RELEASE_PUBKEY_SHA256="711424e4535f84093fefb024cd1ca4ec87439e53907b305b79a631d5befba9c8"

curl -fsSL "$BASE/checksums.json" -o "$TMP_DIR/checksums.json"
curl -fsSL "$BASE/checksums.sig" -o "$TMP_DIR/checksums.sig"
curl -fsSL "$BASE/signing-public.pem" -o "$TMP_DIR/signing-public.pem"
curl -fsSL "$BASE/$ZIP_NAME" -o "$TMP_DIR/$ZIP_NAME"
curl -fsSL "$BASE/SKILL.md" -o "$TMP_DIR/SKILL.md"
curl -fsSL "$BASE/skill.json" -o "$TMP_DIR/skill.json"

ACTUAL_PUBKEY_SHA256="$(openssl pkey -pubin -in "$TMP_DIR/signing-public.pem" -outform DER | shasum -a 256 | awk '{print $1}')"
if [ "$ACTUAL_PUBKEY_SHA256" != "$RELEASE_PUBKEY_SHA256" ]; then
  echo "ERROR: signing-public.pem fingerprint mismatch" >&2
  exit 1
fi

openssl base64 -d -A -in "$TMP_DIR/checksums.sig" -out "$TMP_DIR/checksums.sig.bin"
openssl pkeyutl -verify -rawin -pubin \
  -inkey "$TMP_DIR/signing-public.pem" \
  -sigfile "$TMP_DIR/checksums.sig.bin" \
  -in "$TMP_DIR/checksums.json" >/dev/null

hash_file() {
  if command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
    shasum -a 256 "$1" | awk '{print $1}'
  else
    sha256sum "$1" | awk '{print $1}'
  fi
}

verify_manifest_file() {
  asset="$1"
  path="$2"
  expected="$(jq -r --arg asset "$asset" '.files[$asset].sha256 // empty' "$TMP_DIR/checksums.json")"
  if [ -z "$expected" ]; then
    echo "ERROR: checksums.json missing $asset" >&2
    exit 1
  fi
  actual="$(hash_file "$path")"
  if [ "$actual" != "$expected" ]; then
    echo "ERROR: checksum mismatch for $asset" >&2
    exit 1
  fi
}

expected_archive="$(jq -r '.archive.sha256 // empty' "$TMP_DIR/checksums.json")"
if [ -z "$expected_archive" ]; then
  echo "ERROR: checksums.json missing archive.sha256" >&2
  exit 1
fi
actual_archive="$(hash_file "$TMP_DIR/$ZIP_NAME")"
if [ "$actual_archive" != "$expected_archive" ]; then
  echo "ERROR: archive checksum mismatch" >&2
  exit 1
fi

verify_manifest_file "SKILL.md" "$TMP_DIR/SKILL.md"
verify_manifest_file "skill.json" "$TMP_DIR/skill.json"

echo "Signed release manifest, archive, SKILL.md, and skill.json verified."

Only install or extract the archive after this verification succeeds.

Scope

Builders should use this skill as the NanoClaw landing zone for runtime traffic monitoring:

• host-side HTTP proxy inspection
• optional HTTPS inspection with host-held CA material
• outbound exfiltration detection
• inbound injection detection
• redacted local threat logs
• MCP tools for status, findings, and config checks
• IPC handlers for container-safe host communication

Prefer this as an optional companion to clawsec-nanoclaw, not as a mandatory extension of the existing advisory/signature/integrity suite.

Safety Contract

• Opt-in only.
• Detect-and-log by default.
• No automatic system CA installation.
• No CA private key access from the container.
• No blocking in the first implementation.
• Redact secrets before logs or MCP responses.
• Keep all state under NANOCLAW_TRAFFIC_GUARDIAN_HOME or the host-managed NanoClaw security data directory.

Builder Entry Points

Read SPEC.md before implementing. Use the placeholder folders as follows:

Path	Intended use
lib/	Detector rules, redaction, types, report formatting
host-services/	Host-side proxy lifecycle, log access, IPC handlers
mcp-tools/	Container-side MCP tools for status and findings
test/	Unit tests, host/container IPC tests, redaction tests

Required First Implementation Behavior

1. Validate config without starting the proxy.
2. Start monitor through a host-managed lifecycle path.
3. Keep CA key material on the host side.
4. Inspect HTTP request/response text up to a bounded byte limit.
5. Support optional HTTPS MITM only when the operator supplies per-runtime trust configuration.
6. Emit JSONL findings with redacted snippets.
7. Expose MCP tools that return status and redacted findings only.

Out of Scope for v0.0.1 Implementation

• automatic system trust-store mutation
• transparent network interception
• default blocking
• sending traffic to external services
• exposing raw request/response bodies to the container