T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
scripts/submit_dataify_instagram_comment_by_posturl.py:11- Finding
Unverified External Python Module Is Executed and Receives the API Token
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/submit_dataify_instagram_comment_by_posturl.py, lines 11–14 and 173
Vulnerability Type: Untrusted dependency loading and module substitution
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
python TASK_RUNTIME_DIR = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "..", "..", "dataify-task-operations", "scripts")) if TASK_RUNTIME_DIR not in sys.path: sys.path.insert(0, TASK_RUNTIME_DIR) from task_runtime import complete_taskThe imported function is subsequently given the API token:
python final_result = complete_task(task_id, api_token, args.wait_timeout)Technical Analysis
The script constructs a path to a sibling directory outside the audited Skill package, prepends that directory to
sys.path, and importstask_runtimefrom it. Python executes a module's top-level code as soon as it is imported.The external
dataify-task-operations/scripts/task_runtime.pydependency is not included in the audited project. Its source, version, integrity, installation permissions, and update mechanism therefore cannot be verified from this package. Prepending the directory tosys.pathalso gives that location priority during module resolution.This creates a module-substitution and supply-chain risk. Any actor capable of creating or replacing
task_runtime.pyin the expected sibling directory could cause arbitrary Python code to execute when the Skill starts. The importedcomplete_taskfunction is later explicitly provided withapi_token, further exposing the credential to unaudited code.Attack Path
- An attacker obtains write access to the expected sibling directory:
dataify-task-operations/scripts. - The attacker creates or replaces
task_runtime.pywith a malicious implementation. - A user invokes
submit_dataify_instagram_comment_by_posturl.py. - The script inserts the attacker-controlled directory at the beg ...[truncated 1364 chars]
- An attacker obtains write access to the expected sibling directory:
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Package
task_runtimewithin a reviewed, versioned Python package rather than importing it from an adjacent filesystem directory. - Install the dependency through a controlled package-management process with an exact version and cryptographic hash pinned in a lock file or requirements file.
- Remove the manual
sys.path.insert(0, ...)modification and use a normal package import from a trusted installation location. - Ensure the dependency directory is not writable by untrusted users or lower-privileged processes.
- Include the runtime dependency in the security-review scope and verify its network destinations, credential handling, result-download behavior, and error logging.
- Avoid passing the full API token to external components where possible. Prefer a narrowly scoped, short-lived credential or keep authenticated operations in the audited script.
- Add startup validation that confirms the imported module's resolved path and, where feasible, verifies its expected cryptographic digest before use.
- Ensure exceptions and diagnostics from the dependency never include the API token or authenticated request headers.
- Package