T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
scripts/submit_dataify_facebook_post_by_url.py:11- Finding
Untrusted Out-of-Project Runtime Import Can Execute Arbitrary Code and Access the API Token
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/submit_dataify_facebook_post_by_url.py, lines 11-14 and 176-178
Vulnerability Type: Unsafe dependency loading from a mutable sibling directory
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code:
python TASK_RUNTIME_DIR = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "..", "..", "dataify-task-operations", "scripts")) if TASK_RUNTIME_DIR not in sys.path: sys.path.insert(0, TASK_RUNTIME_DIR) from task_runtime import complete_taskpython if not args.no_wait: try: final_result = complete_task(task_id, api_token, args.wait_timeout)Technical Analysis
The script constructs a path outside the audited project, places that directory at the beginning of
sys.path, and importstask_runtimewithout version pinning, integrity verification, or package-origin validation.Because Python executes module-level code during import, any
task_runtime.pyplaced in the siblingdataify-task-operations/scriptsdirectory executes as soon as this script starts. This occurs before argument processing and therefore can also happen for invocations such as--helpor--no-wait.During the normal task-monitoring workflow, the imported
complete_taskfunction is explicitly given the reusableDATAIFY_API_TOKEN. The external module is not included in the audited artifact, so its implementation, provenance, and credential-handling behavior cannot be verified. Although asynchronous monitoring is part of the declared functionality, trusting mutable code outside the Skill package without verification exceeds the minimum dependency trust boundary necessary to implement that behavior.Attack Path
- An attacker obtains write access to the sibling
dataify-task-operations/scriptsdirectory or compromises its installation/update source. - The attacker creates or replaces
task_runtime.pywith malicious Python code. - A user or Agent invokes ...[truncated 1166 chars]
- An attacker obtains write access to the sibling
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Package
task_runtimeinside the Skill or install it as a formally declared dependency from a trusted, authenticated source. - Pin the dependency to an exact version and verify its cryptographic hash or signed release before execution.
- Remove the
sys.path.insert(0, ...)pattern. Use a normal package import whose origin is controlled by the application. - If an external runtime remains necessary, resolve its canonical path and verify that it is an expected regular file owned by a trusted account and not writable by untrusted users.
- Defer importing the monitoring runtime until after argument parsing and only when
--no-waitis not selected. This reduces unnecessary exposure but does not replace provenance verification. - Validate the imported module's resolved
__file__against an approved installation directory before invoking it. - Prefer a narrow monitoring interface that does not give an unaudited component a reusable API token. Where supported, use a task-scoped, read-only, short-lived credential.
- Add dependency integrity and module-origin checks to automated tests and release validation.
- Package
