T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
scripts/submit_dataify_facebook_comment_by_url.py:11- Finding
Untrusted Out-of-Project Python Module Loading
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/submit_dataify_facebook_comment_by_url.py, lines 11–14 and 217
Vulnerability Type: Unsafe dependency loading from a predictable external directory
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
python TASK_RUNTIME_DIR = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "..", "..", "dataify-task-operations", "scripts")) if TASK_RUNTIME_DIR not in sys.path: sys.path.insert(0, TASK_RUNTIME_DIR) from task_runtime import complete_taskThe imported function later receives the API credential:
python final_result = complete_task(task_id, api_token, args.wait_timeout)Technical Analysis
The script constructs a predictable path outside the audited project, prepends it to
sys.path, and importstask_runtimefrom that location. The external module is not included in the project, version-pinned, integrity-checked, or validated to originate from a trusted installation.Python executes module-level code during import. Consequently, a malicious
task_runtime.pyplaced in the expected sibling directory can execute arbitrary code as soon as this script starts. The importedcomplete_taskfunction is also passedapi_token, directly exposing the Dataify bearer credential to the unverified dependency.This behavior exceeds the minimum privilege needed to submit the collection job because it grants an unaudited external module code-execution capability and access to the API token.
Attack Path
- An attacker obtains write access to the predictable sibling path
../../dataify-task-operations/scripts/relative to this script. - The attacker creates or replaces
task_runtime.pywith malicious Python code. - A user invokes the legitimate submission script according to the documented workflow.
- The script prepends the attacker-influenced directory to
sys.path. - Python imports the malicious module and executes its top-level code with the privileges of the user running the Skill. 6 ...[truncated 941 chars]
- An attacker obtains write access to the predictable sibling path
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the runtime
sys.pathmodification and avoid loading modules from predictable directories outside the project. - Package
task_runtimeas a normal, authenticated dependency with an exact version and integrity hash, or include the required monitoring implementation directly in the audited Skill package. - Install dependencies into an isolated virtual environment from a trusted, authenticated package source.
- If an external module is unavoidable, resolve it from an administrator-controlled location and verify its canonical path and cryptographic digest before importing it.
- Restrict directory permissions so untrusted users cannot create or replace dependency files.
- Minimize credential exposure by keeping Dataify API calls in audited code. Do not pass the bearer token to components whose provenance and integrity have not been verified.
- Add a runtime assertion using the imported module's resolved file path to ensure it originates from the expected trusted package location; treat this as defense in depth rather than a substitute for secure dependency packaging.
- Add automated tests that fail if imports resolve outside the approved environment or project package.
- Remove the runtime