T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
scripts/search.py:46- Finding
Mutable Remote Homebrew Installer Downloaded and Executed Without Verification
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill provides local meta-search, but ordinary search requests can automatically install software, modify shell configuration, and start local services.
Install only if you are comfortable with a search request changing the host system: it may install Homebrew, Python, Valkey, and SearXNG, modify ~/.zshrc, pull unpinned code from the network, and leave local services running. Prefer a version that separates setup from search, asks for explicit confirmation, pins and verifies dependencies, uses a private app directory, and provides a clear uninstall path.
scripts/search.py:46Mutable Remote Homebrew Installer Downloaded and Executed Without Verification
scripts/search.py:218Unpinned SearXNG Source and Python Dependencies Are Installed and Executed
scripts/search.py:265Publicly Known Static Secret Assigned to Every SearXNG Installation
scripts/search.py:310Predictable Shared Temporary Log Path Permits Symbolic-Link Redirection
The trigger phrases are broad and overlap with ordinary language such as '搜索', '帮我搜', and 'xxx是什么', making accidental activation likely. In this skill's context, accidental activation is more dangerous than usual because invoking the skill may lead to package installation, service startup, and other system changes rather than a harmless read-only lookup.
The code downloads and executes a remote Homebrew installer script via curl and bash without any confirmation. This is dangerous because it grants code execution based on network content and trust in an external repository, making compromise of the upstream source, transport, or environment highly impactful.
Automatically appending to ~/.zshrc persists changes to the user's shell environment without consent. Persistent profile modification can alter future sessions, create hard-to-diagnose side effects, and is especially risky when done by a skill whose advertised function is merely searching the web.
The skill documentation describes capabilities that imply shell execution and filesystem modification, but it declares no explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. For a skill that can install packages, clone software, and manage services, the absence of scoped permissions materially increases the chance of unintended or excessive system access.
Although presented as a web search skill, the documentation states it will automatically install Homebrew, Python, Valkey, and SearXNG, which are significant system-modifying actions unrelated to a simple search request. This expands the trust boundary from 'search the web' to 'change the host environment,' creating risk of unauthorized software installation, persistence, and supply-chain exposure.
The skill states that first use will automatically install multiple system components, yet it does not provide an explicit warning or consent checkpoint for these host-modifying actions. Users asking for a search may unknowingly authorize package manager installation, background services, and software downloads, which is a serious mismatch between user intent and system impact.
The file description and user-facing output are Chinese-centric, and the CLI default language is set to zh-CN. This may violate a language/locale policy when no user opt-in or explicit locale selection is provided as the default interaction mode.
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
def _run(cmd, timeout=120, **kw):
return subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, **kw)
def _popen(cmd, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, **kw):
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
def _popen(cmd, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, **kw):
return subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=stdout, stderr=stderr, **kw)
# ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
A search skill should not silently install a package manager and alter shell startup files during normal use. This expands the skill's privileges far beyond user expectations and executes externally fetched code, creating a large supply-chain and integrity risk if the remote installer or network path is compromised.
Installing and daemonizing Valkey in the background is an unjustified capability escalation for a web-search skill. It creates a persistent local service and increases attack surface without informed user consent, especially since the code proceeds automatically as part of making search work.
The stop function uses pkill -f searx.webapp, which can terminate processes system-wide based on a pattern match rather than a tracked PID. In a search-focused skill, that is a non-obvious and potentially disruptive capability that could kill unrelated processes whose command line matches the pattern.
The search function sets lang='zh-CN' by default and always includes that locale in outgoing search parameters. This imposes a specific language/locale choice on users unless they override it manually, which matches the policy's language constraint concern.
A normal search request can trigger installation of Homebrew, Python, Valkey, git clone operations, dependency installation, and service startup. Hidden side effects on a routine search path violate least surprise and least privilege, and they increase the likelihood that users authorize or trigger risky system changes unintentionally.
The option description specifies a default language of “zh-CN”, which sets a locale preference without indicating user choice or opt-in. This may conflict with organizational language/locale policy when the skill is used by users expecting locale neutrality or explicit selection.
The skill advertises itself as zero-configuration search, but also exposes install/start/stop/status lifecycle controls for local services. This is dangerous because users or calling agents may invoke what seems like a benign search skill while actually gaining operational control over background services and installation flows.
The skill clones third-party code into the user's Downloads directory and rewrites application configuration files while presenting itself as zero-configuration search. That mismatch in disclosure matters because it obscures material side effects and introduces supply-chain risk from pulling and modifying a large external codebase at runtime.