T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:10- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Execution Through uvx
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 10–16
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned external dependency execution
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
markdown One entry point for turning YouTube into artifacts. All data access goes through the **`uvx yt-mem-ai <cmd>`** CLI (see [[yt]] for the full command surface) — never touch the LanceDB store directly. Always invoke it exactly that way: zero-install and cached, so nothing has to be on PATH. **Do not go looking for a `yt-ai` binary** — the native plugins install no package. (Only inside a source checkout may you use `uv run yt-ai <cmd>`.) **Single-quote every URL** —Related instructions expand the dependency's potential access to browser authentication data at
SKILL.md, lines 42–44:markdown - Blocked instead? `Sign in to confirm you're not a bot` → run `uvx yt-mem-ai config set YT_COOKIES_BROWSER chrome` and retry; `captions blocked ... IP rate-limited` → cookies won't help, seeTechnical Analysis
The Skill mandates execution of
yt-mem-aithroughuvxwithout specifying an exact, audited package version or an integrity hash. Consequently, the effective implementation is not fixed by the reviewed Skill content. Package resolution may retrieve and execute a release whose behavior differs from the version originally reviewed.This creates a supply-chain trust boundary in which the external package is given the local Agent user's execution privileges. The package processes user-provided URLs, downloads content, reads and writes local application data, and generates artifacts. The optional Chrome-cookie configuration further increases exposure because the executed dependency may be permitted to obtain authentication material from a local browser profile.
The issue does not establish that the current package is malicious. The vulnerability is that future package compromise, account takeover, malicious p ...[truncated 1906 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Replace the unversioned invocation with an exact, reviewed package version, such as an explicit
yt-mem-ai==X.Y.Zpackage specification supported by the execution environment. - Use a lockfile or equivalent dependency manifest containing cryptographic hashes for the package and all transitive dependencies.
- Configure package resolution to use a trusted, explicitly defined package index and disable untrusted extra indexes to reduce dependency-confusion exposure.
- Record the verified package source, publisher, version, and integrity values in the Skill documentation.
- Prefer vendoring or distributing reviewed implementation code with the Skill when feasible, rather than dynamically resolving executable code at invocation time.
- Execute the CLI in a sandbox with minimal filesystem access, restricted environment variables, and outbound network access limited to required services.
- Require explicit, informed user approval before enabling browser-cookie access. Run cookie-dependent operations in a separately constrained process and avoid exposing unrelated browser profiles.
- Establish a dependency update process that requires security review and integrity verification before changing the pinned version.
- Replace the unversioned invocation with an exact, reviewed package version, such as an explicit