T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
scripts/install.sh:4- Finding
Unpinned Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Content
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/dev/null || { rm -rf "$INSTALL_DIR" git clone "$REPO" "$INSTALL_DIR" cd "$INSTALL_DIR" } else git clone "$REPO" "$INSTALL_DIR" cd "$INSTALL_DIR" fi pip install -e . 2>/dev/null || { echo "❌ Install failed"; exit 1; } ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation script clones the current default branch of an external Git repository and installs its contents using `pip install -e .`. It does not pin an immutable commit hash, verify a cryptographic checksum, validate a signature, or otherwise confirm that the downloaded source matches a reviewed version. The effective payload can therefore change after this skill package has been reviewed. In addition, Python package installation may invoke attacker-controlled build backends or packaging hooks. Because the external repository's implementation is not included in the audited artifact, the code ultimately installed and potentially executed cannot be assessed by this audit. Although the external URL matches the homepage declared in `SKILL.md`, that correspondence does not provide integrity or protect against upstream account, repository, dependency, or branch compromise. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the upstream repository, a maintainer account, or another mechanism capable of modifying its default branch. 2. The attacker adds malicious Python packaging hooks, build configuration, or importable application code. 3. A user executes the documented `scripts/inst ...[truncated 928 chars]- Remediation
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