Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This Discord safety helper is appropriately scoped and clearly depends on a trusted platform integration to authenticate requests and enforce attribution.
Treat this as one component of your Discord integration. The trusted host must authenticate the requester, insert the attribution prefix, enforce the bound target, and supply genuine delivery evidence. A helper PASS alone does not establish those facts. Test that integration before relying on it for confidential messages; the package tests cover local validation only.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
1. Run `node scripts/recipient_safety.mjs pre-send --roster <approved-roster.json> --pause <relay-pause.json> --request <request.json>`.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
erId`, `attributionPrefix`, platform message ID, and delivery result. Run `node scripts/recipient_safety.mjs receipt --binding <binding.json> --delivery <delive
The validator authorizes a requester using the supplied Discord user ID but does not authenticate who submitted the request or verify that the referenced source message belongs to that user and contains the recipient instruction. If an attacker can influence request inputs, they can impersonate an approved requester and obtain a PASS for unauthorized relays; this directly undermines the skill's promised requester authentication, although a trusted upstream authentication layer could mitigate it.
Pre-send validation generates an attributionPrefix but never checks or constructs the outgoing message, while receipt validation only compares supplied metadata after delivery. A sender can omit attribution from the actual message and still submit matching metadata, enabling unattributed or misleading relays despite the skill's explicit attribution requirement.