Back to skill

Security audit

Muxray

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly coherent and read-only, but its installation path and examples create review-worthy risk around mutable external code and broad tmux-pane access.

Review before installing. Prefer a pinned muxray release or verified binary instead of @latest, and do not use the README curl | sh installer. Use targeted pane commands for single-pane questions; reserve scan for explicit fleet-wide inspection, because tmux pane text may include secrets.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (3)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
README.md:49
Finding

Unverified Remote Installer Is Executed Directly Through a Shell

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:5
Finding

Dependency Installation Uses a Mutable Latest Version

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
examples/inspect-agent.md:1
Finding

Single-Pane Example Performs an Unnecessary Fleet-Wide Scan

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (7)

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The | sh construct executes remote content directly in a shell, which is dangerous because any attacker-controlled modification to the fetched script results in immediate arbitrary code execution on the host. In the context of a skill for developer agents, this is more dangerous than generic documentation because the surrounding audience is likely to automate setup steps and may run them in privileged development environments.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 51)May include surrounding context.

bash
go install github.com/dandriscoll/muxray/cmd/muxray@latest   # matches the skill's install spec
# or the project installer / a GitHub release:
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/dandriscoll/muxray/main/install.sh | sh

Install the skill

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The declared description emphasizes inspecting tmux panes as JSON across the whole fleet and classifying multiple agent types. This code chunk is narrower: it operates only on one pane target provided via -t, captures a baseline snapshot, waits for that pane to settle, and runs a diff. While this partially aligns with 'snapshot' and 'diff', it does not implement fleet-wide inspection, and its stdout includes human-readable comment markers (# ...) rather than only JSON documents. Any agent-state classification appears delegated to muxray watch, not implemented here as explicit Claude/Codex/Copilot fleet classification. Therefore the description overstates the scope and behavior of this specific code chunk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 170)May include surrounding context.

md
## Reporting findings to the user

- Lead with the **classification**, not a wall of terminal text: e.g.
  "`work:1.0` — Codex, `needs_approval` (asking to run `rm -rf build/`)."
- For change, summarize the `diff.summary` + the few `added` lines that matter;
  do not paste the whole pane.
- For a fleet, render `muxray scan --text` (one line per pane) and call out only

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 162)May include surrounding context.

md
| ------ | ------- | -------------- |
| `running` | actively working | wait (`watch`) |
| `idle` / `completed` | done / at rest | assign next task |
| `needs_approval` | paused on a permission prompt | surface to human; do **not** auto-approve |
| `waiting_for_input` | paused on a question | surface to human |
| `blocked` | stuck (e.g. rate-limited) | inspect / alert |
| `error` | the agent hit an error | restart / alert |

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · examples/inspect-agent.md (reported line 37)May include surrounding context.

md
| ------ | ------- | -------------- |
| `running` | actively working | wait (`watch`) |
| `idle` / `completed` | done / at rest | assign next task |
| `needs_approval` | paused on a permission prompt | surface to human; do **not** auto-approve |
| `waiting_for_input` | paused on a question | surface to human |
| `blocked` | stuck (e.g. rate-limited) | inspect / alert |
| `error` | the agent hit an error | restart / alert |

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/json-contract.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

md
| ------ | ------- | -------------- |
| `running` | actively working | wait (`watch`) |
| `idle` / `completed` | done / at rest | assign next task |
| `needs_approval` | paused on a permission prompt | surface to human; do **not** auto-approve |
| `waiting_for_input` | paused on a question | surface to human |
| `blocked` | stuck (e.g. rate-limited) | inspect / alert |
| `error` | the agent hit an error | restart / alert |

External Script Fetching

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The README instructs users to fetch and immediately execute a remote shell script via curl ... | sh, which bypasses review of the downloaded content and creates a supply-chain execution path if the GitHub account, repository, branch, or transport is compromised. Even though this appears in documentation rather than executable skill logic, installation instructions are commonly copied verbatim by users, so it still materially increases risk.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 51)May include surrounding context.

bash
go install github.com/dandriscoll/muxray/cmd/muxray@latest   # matches the skill's install spec
# or the project installer / a GitHub release:
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/dandriscoll/muxray/main/install.sh | sh

Install the skill