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Security audit

Notamify NOTAM Skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent Notamify integration that uses a disclosed API token and SDK to fetch aviation NOTAM data, with one dependency hygiene risk to consider.

Install in a virtual environment, pin and review the `notamify-sdk` version where possible, and expose only the Notamify token needed for this workflow. Treat returned NOTAM analysis as informational and verify operational decisions against official aviation sources.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:18
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party SDK Installation Creates a Supply-Chain Risk

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 18–22
Vulnerability Type: T08: Insecure Dependencies
Risk Level: Medium

Complete Code Snippet:

markdown
## Setup

Install the SDK (Python 3.10+):

```bash
pip install notamify-sdk
text

### Technical Analysis

The skill instructs the agent or user to install `notamify-sdk` from PyPI without pinning a reviewed version or verifying an integrity hash. Consequently, the code installed and executed can change after this skill has been audited.

Installing and importing a Python package can execute package-controlled code during installation or runtime. The SDK is also intentionally used in a process containing the `NOTAMIFY_TOKEN` environment variable. A compromised publisher account, malicious future package release, or compromised transitive dependency could therefore introduce arbitrary behavior that is absent from the reviewed project.

This finding establishes an unsafe dependency-management practice; it does not establish that the current `notamify-sdk` release is malicious.

### Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the package publisher, package distribution process, or a transitive dependency.
2. The attacker publishes a malicious release under the expected package name.
3. An agent or user follows the skill's unpinned `pip install notamify-sdk` instruction.
4. PyPI resolves the request to the attacker-controlled release.
5. Package-controlled code executes during installation or when imported by the generated scripts.
6. The malicious code operates with the Python process's permissions and may access `NOTAMIFY_TOKEN`, readable local configuration, files, and available network resources.

### Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the account running `pip` or the Python scripts. The affected scope may include the API token, Notamify configuration files, other envi
...[truncated 364 chars]
Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin notamify-sdk to a specific version that has been reviewed, for example:
    bash
    python -m pip install "notamify-sdk==X.Y.Z"
    
  2. Maintain a locked requirements file containing exact versions for the SDK and all transitive dependencies.
  3. Record package hashes and install with hash enforcement:
    bash
    python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt
    
  4. Verify the package publisher, source repository, release provenance, and correspondence between source tags and published artifacts.
  5. Run dependency and package-artifact scanning before approving upgrades.
  6. Install and execute the SDK in an isolated virtual environment or container under a non-privileged account.
  7. Expose only the required NOTAMIFY_TOKEN to the process and avoid passing unrelated secrets through its environment.
  8. Establish a controlled dependency-update process in which version and hash changes require review before deployment.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep