T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning
- Location
SKILL.md:60- Finding
Persistent Modification of Agent Instructions and Long-Term Memory
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is mostly coherent with OpenClaw setup, but it asks for persistent agent behavior, scheduled jobs, and plaintext token printing without enough safeguards.
Review before installing. The OpenClaw configuration guidance is generally aligned with the stated setup purpose, but you should avoid running the token audit as written, require explicit approval before any AGENTS.md, HEARTBEAT.md, cron, or memory-rule changes, and ensure any scheduled work has a clear command, limited scope, expiration, logs without secrets, and removal steps.
SKILL.md:60Persistent Modification of Agent Instructions and Long-Term Memory
SKILL.md:74Automatic Creation of Cross-Session Scheduled Jobs
SKILL.md:39Gateway Authentication Tokens Printed in Plaintext
references/examples.md:40Persistent Local Rules Generated from Untrusted Memory Content
Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
---
name: openclaw-growth-pack
description: Turn a fresh OpenClaw install into a reliable execution agent. Use when users report "asks step-by-step only", stalls mid-task, token mismatch, or model routing/auth failures. Apply a production onboarding baseline: model routing, gateway token consistency, anti-stall heartbeat, lightweight autonomy loop, and verification checklist.
---
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
## Example A: Fix 401 after valid key
Symptoms:
- `HTTP 401: invalid access token or token expired`
- key is valid in provider console
Checks:
The skill instructs operators to read and print gateway.auth.token and gateway.remote.token directly to console, which unnecessarily exposes secrets in terminal output, logs, screenshots, or shared session recordings. Even though this is framed as troubleshooting, the workflow lacks masking, redaction guidance, or safer comparison methods, so it creates a real credential-handling weakness.
No suspicious patterns detected.