T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:69- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Components and Unverified Remote Installer Execution
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:69-80;README.md:7-13
Vulnerability Type: Unverified and unpinned third-party dependencies
Risk Level: MediumThe installation instructions retrieve multiple mutable third-party skills without specifying trusted versions, hashes, or signatures. The documented setup process also clones a remote repository and executes
install.ps1, although that script is absent from the audited artifact and therefore could not be inspected.Affected code in
SKILL.md:69-80:powershell # 内容改写 py -m clawhub install humanizer py -m clawhub install md2wechat py -m clawhub install wechat-article-extractor # 定时发布 py -m clawhub install cron # 数据追踪 py -m clawhub install tavily-search # 评论互动 py -m clawhub install wechat-managementAffected code in
README.md:7-13:powershell # 克隆套装仓库 git clone https://github.com/clawhub/content-creator-bundle.git cd content-creator-bundle # 安装所有依赖技能 ./install.ps1Technical Analysis
Dependency installation commands resolve package names without immutable version constraints. Consequently, the code installed when a user follows these instructions can differ from the code originally reviewed. No package checksums, cryptographic signatures, trusted publisher identifiers, or lock file are supplied.
The README workflow has the same trust issue at the repository level:
git cloneretrieves the repository's current default branch, after which a PowerShell installer is executed. Because neither a reviewed commit hash nor integrity verification is specified, an upstream compromise or later malicious modification could change the effective installer payload. Moreover,install.ps1is not included in the audited artifact, preventing validation of its commands and privileges.Exploitation depends on compromise, replacement, or malicious publication of one of the named upstream components. The audited do ...[truncated 1749 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin every ClawHub dependency to an explicitly reviewed, immutable version. Avoid resolving packages solely by mutable names.
- Maintain a lock file containing exact versions and integrity hashes for all direct and transitive dependencies.
- Pin the Git repository to a reviewed commit hash or signed release tag rather than cloning and executing the current default branch.
- Publish cryptographic checksums or signatures for
install.ps1and verify them before execution. - Include the installer in the distributed artifact so its behavior can be audited together with the documentation.
- Require signature verification and validate that packages originate from expected publisher identities.
- Display the installer contents and obtain explicit user confirmation before executing it.
- Run installation with the least-privileged account required and avoid administrator or root execution.
- Isolate dependency installation in a sandbox, container, or disposable environment before granting access to production platform credentials.
- Add automated dependency provenance, integrity, and vulnerability checks to the release process.
