T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Warning
- Location
scripts/diagnose.sh:151- Finding
Execution of an Untrusted Workspace Log-Rotation Script
- Content
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/dev/null 2>&1 && fixed "Logs rotated" fi ``` ### Technical Analysis When invoked with `--fix`, the diagnostic executes `~/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/log_rotate.sh` if the OpenClaw log directory exceeds 500 MB. This script is outside the audited Skill package and may reside in a user-modifiable workspace. Before execution, the code only confirms that the path is a regular file. It does not validate: - The file's owner or group - Whether its permissions permit modification by untrusted users - Its canonical path or possible symbolic-link resolution - Its provenance or relationship to this Skill - Its integrity through a pinned cryptographic hash - Whether the file changed between validation and execution Consequently, the diagnostic crosses a local trust boundary by treating a mutable workspace file as executable trusted code. Quoting the path prevents argument splitting but does not mitigate malicious contents within the script. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker, compromised process, malicious extension, or other actor with write access to `~/.openclaw/workspace/scripts/` creates or replaces `log_rotate.sh`. 2. The attacker inserts arbitrary shell commands into that file. 3. The OpenClaw log directory reaches the script's failure threshold of at least 500 MB. 4. A user or agent invokes: ```bash bash scripts/diagnose.sh --fix ``` 5. The diagnostic launches the attacker-controlled file with `bash`. 6. The injected commands execute under the identity and environment of the account running the diagnostic. This path requires local write access to the workspace and explicit use of `--fix`; it is not triggered during the documented read-on ...[truncated 783 chars]- Remediation
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