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Security audit

NEXUS Regex Generator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a paid remote regex-generation skill that clearly discloses its network call and payment requirements, with no local filesystem, shell, persistence, or hidden behavior found.

Install only if you are comfortable sending regex prompts and payment metadata to NEXUS over HTTPS. Do not use it with secrets, confidential code, or regulated data unless your environment permits that provider and payment flow; prefer sandbox_test or narrowly scoped payment proofs for testing.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (6)

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Content
Or manually copy the `SKILL.md` to your OpenClaw skills directory:

```bash
cp SKILL.md ~/.openclaw/skills/nexus-regex-generator/SKILL.md
```

## Usage
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The README states the skill is 'automatically invoked' when a matching task is detected, but it provides no trigger boundaries, consent model, or limitations on what data may be sent to the external service. In an agent environment, ambiguous auto-invocation can lead to unintended transmission of user prompts or sensitive context to a remote endpoint.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```bash
# Step 1: Get the x402/MPP challenge
curl -X POST https://ai-service-hub-15.emergent.host/api/original-services/regex-generator \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"input": "your query here"}'
# Returns 402 + WWW-Authenticate: Payment header
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The documented workflow sends user-provided input to a third-party remote service over the network. In the context of an auto-invoked agent skill, this creates a real risk of external data exfiltration if prompts, secrets, proprietary code, or conversation context are forwarded without explicit minimization and consent.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The skill is presented as a simple regex generator, but it also embeds extensive payment, settlement, and multi-protocol capabilities that are not necessary to fulfill that purpose. This broadens the trust boundary and attack surface by encouraging agents to handle payment credentials and interact with several external protocol endpoints, increasing the chance of unintended fund movement, credential misuse, or unsafe integration decisions.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### API Call

```bash
curl -X POST https://ai-service-hub-15.emergent.host/api/original-services/regex-generator \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "X-Payment-Proof: $NEXUS_PAYMENT_PROOF" \
  -d '{
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly instructs sending user input and a payment proof environment-derived credential to an external third-party service. Even though external transmission is expected for an API-backed skill, this still creates a real data exposure and secret-handling risk because user prompts and payment artifacts leave the local agent boundary and are processed by a remote provider.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Low
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The skill is described as a regex generator, but the tags include unrelated domains such as health-monitoring and budget. These labels suggest capabilities or contexts not supported by the rest of the skill and create misleading expectations about intended use.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.