Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a disclosed paid translation skill that sends user text to a remote NEXUS service, with no evidence of hidden local access, persistence, or deception.
Install only if you trust NEXUS with the text you translate and with the payment proof used for billing. Do not use it for secrets, credentials, regulated data, or confidential documents unless remote processing by this provider is acceptable.
Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
Or manually copy the SKILL.md to your OpenClaw skills directory:
cp SKILL.md ~/.openclaw/skills/nexus-quick-translate/SKILL.md
The README states the skill is 'automatically invoked' when a matching task is detected, but it does not define trigger boundaries, approval requirements, or limits on what content may be sent. In the context of a remote translation service, this ambiguity can cause unintended activation and transmission of sensitive user text to an external endpoint.
The skill description does not warn users that submitted text is sent off-device to a third-party hosted endpoint for processing. This creates a privacy and data handling risk because users or calling agents may assume local processing and inadvertently disclose confidential content.
The documented behavior sends user-provided input to an external network service for translation, which is an actual data egress path. In a translation skill this is expected functionality, but it remains security-relevant because any sensitive text included in requests leaves the local trust boundary and may be exposed to remote logging, retention, or compromise.
# Step 1: Get the x402/MPP challenge
curl -X POST https://ai-service-hub-15.emergent.host/api/original-services/quick-translate \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"input": "your query here"}'
# Returns 402 + WWW-Authenticate: Payment header
The skill defines its required input only as a generic string described as "input text or query," which is broad enough to encourage users or agents to submit arbitrary content without clear constraints. In this context, the skill forwards that content to a third-party remote service, so ambiguous scope increases the chance that sensitive, regulated, or unrelated data is sent off-platform unintentionally.
The skill instructs the agent to transmit user-supplied input and a payment proof token to an external host over the network. While this is expected functionality for a translation SaaS, it is still a real data-exfiltration surface because arbitrary submitted text and authentication/payment material leave the local trust boundary and are processed by an external provider.
curl -X POST https://ai-service-hub-15.emergent.host/api/original-services/quick-translate \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "X-Payment-Proof: $NEXUS_PAYMENT_PROOF" \
-d '{
The skill states that requests are processed server-side by specific LLM providers and only offers a passive opt-out by not installing the skill, rather than a per-request consent or provider choice. This creates a privacy and governance risk because user content may be routed to external model providers without granular control, especially if agents invoke the skill automatically.
No suspicious patterns detected.