Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a coherent paid LLM gateway, but it can send prompts and payment credentials to a remote service under vague auto-invocation conditions.
Review this before installing if you handle confidential prompts or do not want an agent making paid remote LLM calls automatically. Use sandbox or short-lived/limited payment credentials where possible, avoid sending secrets or regulated data, and confirm your agent's invocation and spending controls.
Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
Or manually copy the SKILL.md to your OpenClaw skills directory:
cp SKILL.md ~/.openclaw/skills/nexus-llm-gateway/SKILL.md
The README states the skill is 'automatically invoked' when a 'matching task is detected' but never defines what matching means or what data may be sent when that happens. In an agent ecosystem, vague auto-invocation criteria can cause unexpected triggering and unintended disclosure of user prompts to an external service.
The README provides example requests that send arbitrary user input to a third-party host but does not warn users that prompts may contain sensitive data and will leave the local environment. This creates a real privacy and security risk because operators may enable or use the skill without understanding that confidential prompts are transmitted externally.
The example explicitly transmits user-supplied input to an external domain, which is a genuine data egress behavior. In the context of an auto-invoked agent skill, this is more dangerous because users may not realize their prompts are being sent off-host to a remote LLM gateway and potentially onward to multiple model providers.
# Step 1: Get the x402/MPP challenge
curl -X POST https://ai-service-hub-15.emergent.host/api/original-services/llm-gateway \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"input": "your query here"}'
# Returns 402 + WWW-Authenticate: Payment header
The skill explicitly instructs the agent to transmit user-supplied prompts and a payment credential (X-Payment-Proof) to an external third-party endpoint. This is a real data-exposure and credential-sharing behavior: even if it is the advertised purpose of the skill, it creates privacy and financial risk because sensitive input and payment proof leave the local trust boundary and are processed by a remote service.
curl -X POST https://ai-service-hub-15.emergent.host/api/original-services/llm-gateway \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "X-Payment-Proof: $NEXUS_PAYMENT_PROOF" \
-d '{"prompt": "Write a Python function to sort a list", "tier": "auto", "task_type": "code"}'