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Security audit

NEXUS Cron Builder

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a disclosed paid remote cron-expression service, but it asks agents to send user input and payment/transaction material to a third-party host without clear per-request approval or spending controls.

Review this skill before installing. Use it only if you trust NEXUS with cron-related prompts and payment metadata, avoid sending secrets or internal infrastructure details, prefer sandbox testing, and require separate confirmation for every external request, payment, signed transaction, or mandate.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

other

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:46
Finding

Unnecessary External Disclosure of User Input and Payment Authority

Content
View full analysis
` header. 8. Parse the JSON response and `X-PAYMENT-RESPONSE` header. ### Option B: MPP Standard 1. Call the service endpoint without payment headers. 2. Receive HTTP 402 with `WWW-Authenticate: Payment` header listing all accepted currencies and amounts. 3. Pick your preferred chain + currency: Cardano (ADA, stablecoins) or Stellar (USDC, XLM). 4. Create payment: Masumi escrow (Cardano) or direct Stellar transfer. 5. **Stellar fee sponsorship:** POST your signed XDR to `https://ai-service-hub-15.emergent.host/api/mpp/stellar/sponsor` — NEXUS pays gas, you need 0 XLM. 6. Retry with `Authorization: Payment ` header. 7. Parse the JSON response and `Payment-Receipt` header. ### Option C: Legacy Header 1. Send a POST request to the NEXUS API endpoint with your input. 2. Include the `X-Payment-Proof` header (Masumi payment ID or `sandbox_test` for testing). 3. Parse the JSON response and return the result. ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill performs a task that can ordinarily be completed l ...[truncated 3056 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (5)

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

Or manually copy the SKILL.md to your OpenClaw skills directory:

bash
cp SKILL.md ~/.openclaw/skills/nexus-cron-builder/SKILL.md

Usage

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The README states the skill is 'automatically invoked' when a matching task is detected, but it does not define matching criteria, approval requirements, or safety boundaries. In an agent ecosystem, ambiguous auto-invocation can cause unintended execution of remote capabilities and increase the chance of prompt-triggered tool use or data being sent to an external service without clear user intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users/agents to POST input to an external hosted service, which creates a real data-exfiltration surface: task content may leave the local environment and be processed by a third party. In the context of an auto-invoked agent skill, this is more dangerous because ordinary user prompts or sensitive scheduling details could be transmitted off-host without sufficiently prominent disclosure or gating.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 29)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Step 1: Get the x402/MPP challenge
curl -X POST https://ai-service-hub-15.emergent.host/api/original-services/cron-builder \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"input": "your query here"}'
# Returns 402 + WWW-Authenticate: Payment header

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The skill transmits user input and a payment-related proof/header to an external third-party service endpoint. In context, external transmission is part of the skill's stated function, but it still creates a real privacy and supply-chain risk because potentially sensitive prompts and payment metadata leave the local agent boundary and are processed by a remote operator.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 85)May include surrounding context.

API Call

bash
curl -X POST https://ai-service-hub-15.emergent.host/api/original-services/cron-builder \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "X-Payment-Proof: $NEXUS_PAYMENT_PROOF" \
  -d '{

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill is consistently documented elsewhere as a cron expression generator/explainer, but the tags include unrelated domains 'health-monitoring' and 'budget'. While tags are not executable code, this is inline documentation/metadata that misrepresents the skill's intent and could mislead users about what the skill is for.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.