NEXUS Code Explain

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 11, 2026 · 11:19 PM UTC
• Version: 2.1.0

Overview

This skill is a disclosed paid code-explanation service that sends user-provided input to a remote API, with no local filesystem or shell access requested.

Install only if you are comfortable sending the code or text you ask it to explain to the NEXUS hosted service and using the configured payment proof. Avoid submitting secrets, credentials, private keys, or proprietary code unless your organization permits that provider.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Trigger Abuse: Overly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (4)

Skill Enumeration

Medium

• Category: Agent Snooping

Content

Or manually copy the `SKILL.md` to your OpenClaw skills directory:

```bash
cp SKILL.md ~/.openclaw/skills/nexus-code-explain/SKILL.md
```

## Usage

• Confidence: 80% confidence
• Finding: Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Vague Triggers

Medium

• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The README states the skill is 'automatically invoked ... when a matching task is detected' but does not define the trigger scope, inputs, or safety boundaries. In an agent ecosystem, ambiguous auto-invocation can cause the skill to activate on unintended prompts and send sensitive code or data to the remote service without clear user intent.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

```bash
# Step 1: Get the x402/MPP challenge
curl -X POST https://ai-service-hub-15.emergent.host/api/original-services/code-explain \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"input": "your query here"}'
# Returns 402 + WWW-Authenticate: Payment header

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: The skill is explicitly designed to send user-provided input to an external hosted endpoint, which creates a real data exfiltration/privacy boundary. In the context of a code-explainer skill that may be auto-invoked, this is more dangerous because proprietary source code, secrets, or internal snippets could be transmitted off-host to a third-party service.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

### API Call

```bash
curl -X POST https://ai-service-hub-15.emergent.host/api/original-services/code-explain \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "X-Payment-Proof: $NEXUS_PAYMENT_PROOF" \
  -d '{

• Confidence: 89% confidence
• Finding: The skill explicitly sends user-provided input and a payment proof header to an external third-party service endpoint. This is a real data exfiltration boundary: even if expected for the skill’s purpose, any sensitive code or secrets included in the input will leave the local agent environment and be processed remotely, and the skill’s broad 'input' field provides no built-in restrictions or redaction guidance.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.