T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:118- Finding
Prefix-Based Sandbox Signature Bypass Exposed Through the Payment Mandate API
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This payment skill is coherent but needs review because it asks users to trust a remote service's unsigned wallet transactions for batched payments without clear pre-sign validation or sandbox/mainnet separation.
Install only if you trust the NEXUS service and will manually inspect every wallet signing request. Before signing, verify the decoded transaction fields yourself: destination, amount, currency, issuer, fee, network, memo, and every inner payment in a batch. Do not use sandbox_ signatures or automated signing for production funds unless the service provides a clearly isolated sandbox/mainnet boundary and wallet-side limits.
SKILL.md:118Prefix-Based Sandbox Signature Bypass Exposed Through the Payment Mandate API
SKILL.md:145Unsigned Financial Transactions Are Trusted From an External Construction Service Without Required Field-Level Validation
The README promotes batched settlement of up to 20 payments in one signed transaction but does not prominently warn that this can move real wallet funds, may be irreversible once signed and submitted, and can amplify loss by bundling multiple payments atomically. In a payments skill, missing consent and risk disclosure increases the chance that users or agents authorize financially significant actions without understanding the consequences.
Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
Or manually:
cp SKILL.md ~/.openclaw/skills/nexus-ap2-batched-settle/SKILL.md
The quick start instructs users to POST mandate creation data, including identifiers and signature material, to an external service endpoint. Even though the example appears to use sandbox/demo values, it normalizes transmitting payment authorization metadata to a third-party host without privacy, trust-boundary, retention, or validation warnings.
# 1. Mint a cart mandate
MID=$(curl -sX POST https://ai-service-hub-15.emergent.host/api/ap2/mandates/create \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"mandate_type": "cart",
This example sends mandate IDs and the payer wallet address to a remote API to build a batch payment transaction, directly involving payment flow and wallet-linked metadata. In the context of an atomic settlement skill, this is more dangerous because a compromised or untrusted service could influence transaction construction, misroute funds, or facilitate unintended settlement preparation at scale.
}' | jq -r .mandate_id)
curl -X POST https://ai-service-hub-15.emergent.host/api/ap2/payments/batch
-H "Content-Type: application/json"
-d "{"mandate_ids":["$MID"],"payer_address":"r","chain":"xrpl","mode":"ALLORNOTHING"}"
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
For an Intent Mandate (agent autonomy, e.g. "spend up to 10 XRP this week"):
curl -X POST https://ai-service-hub-15.emergent.host/api/ap2/mandates/create \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"mandate_type": "intent",
The RLUSD setup instructions tell the user to create a trust line but do not clearly warn that this is a state-changing on-ledger action that can consume wallet reserve and alter account exposure. In a payment skill, omission of that warning can mislead users into signing a transaction they may not understand, especially because trust lines are persistent wallet configuration changes rather than simple read-only setup.