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Security audit

Data Validate

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed external data-format validation helper that requires user consent before sending data out.

Install only if you are comfortable sending validation inputs to validate.agentutil.net. Avoid submitting secrets, regulated records, private JSON payloads, or sensitive personal contact data unless you have confirmed consent and compliance requirements.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### URL Validation

```bash
curl -X POST https://validate.agentutil.net/v1/url \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"url": "https://example.com/path"}'
```
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly instructs the agent to send user-provided URLs, JSON data, email addresses, and phone numbers to an external service for validation. Even though the skill mentions obtaining user consent and claims limited retention, this still creates a real data exfiltration path to a third-party endpoint, including possible PII or sensitive schema contents. The context makes this somewhat less suspicious than covert exfiltration because the service purpose matches the data handling, but it remains a genuine privacy and compliance risk.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.