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Security audit

xtaste · 一次记住你的品味

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s local preference recording and temporary quiz match its disclosed purpose and include clear user controls.

Expect automatic storage of short preference excerpts in local plaintext files. Use pause to stop recording. Forget excludes an entry from future preferences but retains its original log line; delete the configured storage directory to erase saved data. Use install --apply --no-onboard to disable automatic quiz prompts. The inspected artifacts do not support the pre-scan malicious signal.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (8)

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, file_write, network, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md
---
name: xtaste
description: "Remember your taste once — every AI after that knows it. Learns the user's personal taste (visual design, writing, naming, code style, way of working, product trade-offs) from a 5-minute local quiz plus their later reactions, and applies it. Use before designing UI, writing copy, naming things or making aesthetic/product choices for the user, and whenever the user reacts to an output with likes, dislikes or corrections. Once installed it acts automatically: on first use it opens a local quiz page in the browser (once; not again for 7 days if ignored), and it records the user's taste statements to ~/.xtaste without asking each time (`xtaste pause` stops recording). Optional and only on the user's request: importing low-weight hints from a local Dongwo (懂我) prompt inbox."
metadata:
  openclaw:
    requires:

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/xtaste.py (reported line 78)May include surrounding context.

python
return "zh" if value.lower().startswith("zh") else "en"
    if sys.platform == "darwin":
        try:
            out = subprocess.run(["defaults", "read", "-g", "AppleLanguages"],
                                 capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=2).stdout
            first = re.search(r'"?([A-Za-z]{2})', out)
            if first:

Tainted flow: 'root' from os.environ.get (line 211, credential/environment) → open (file write)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/xtaste.py (reported line 213)May include surrounding context.

python
def locked():
    root = home()
    root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    with open(root / ".lock", "w") as fh:
        fcntl.flock(fh, fcntl.LOCK_EX)
        try:
            yield

Tainted flow: 'events_path()' from os.environ.get (line 206, credential/environment) → open (file write)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/xtaste.py (reported line 244)May include surrounding context.

python
existing = {e.get("id") for e in read_events()}
    fresh = [e for e in new if e["id"] not in existing]
    if fresh:
        with open(events_path(), "a", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
            for e in fresh:
                fh.write(json.dumps(e, ensure_ascii=False) + "\n")
    return fresh

Tainted flow: 'home()' from os.environ.get (line 51, credential/environment) → open (file write)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/xtaste.py (reported line 881)May include surrounding context.

python
s.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
        port = s.getsockname()[1]
    home().mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    log = open(home() / "onboard.log", "a")
    subprocess.Popen(
        [sys.executable, str(Path(__file__).resolve()), "onboard", "--port", str(port)],
        stdout=log, stderr=log, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, start_new_session=True,

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/xtaste.py (reported line 882)May include surrounding context.

python
port = s.getsockname()[1]
    home().mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    log = open(home() / "onboard.log", "a")
    subprocess.Popen(
        [sys.executable, str(Path(__file__).resolve()), "onboard", "--port", str(port)],
        stdout=log, stderr=log, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, start_new_session=True,
    )

Tainted flow: 'log' from os.environ.get (line 881, credential/environment) → subprocess.Popen (code execution)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/xtaste.py (reported line 882)May include surrounding context.

python
port = s.getsockname()[1]
    home().mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    log = open(home() / "onboard.log", "a")
    subprocess.Popen(
        [sys.executable, str(Path(__file__).resolve()), "onboard", "--port", str(port)],
        stdout=log, stderr=log, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, start_new_session=True,
    )

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.