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Security audit

Near Intents

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is for crypto swaps and is mostly coherent, but its default auto mode can spend from a configured NEAR wallet without a clearly required final user confirmation.

Install only if you are comfortable with an agent-assisted crypto workflow. Prefer manual mode, verify asset, amount, recipient, refund address, quote, deadline, and fees yourself, and do not provide a private key for auto mode unless you use a limited wallet and require explicit approval before every transaction.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • YARA SignaturesMalware Match, Webshell Match, Cryptominer Match
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

YARA rule 'ransomware_behavior': Ransomware-like patterns (mass encryption, ransom notes) [malware]

Critical
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 229)May include surrounding context.

. Swap NEAR → USDC (same chain)

typescript
await executeIntent({
  assetIn: 'NEAR',
  assetOut: 'USDC',
  amount: '2.0',
});

4. Get a quote: How much NEAR for 10 USDC on Arbitrum?

typescript
const quote = await executeIntent({
  assetIn: 'NEAR',
  assetOut: 'arb:USDC',
  amount: '10.0',
  recipient: '0xYourArbAddress',
  mode: 'manual',
  swapType: 'EXACT_OUTPUT',
});

5. Send BTC to NEAR address

typescript
const quote = await executeIntent({
  assetIn: 'btc:BTC',
  assetOut: 'NEAR',
  amount: '0.01',
  recipient: 'yourname.near',
  refundAddress: 'bc1q...',  // REQUIRED - Your Bitcoin address
  mode: 'manual',
});
// User sends 0.01 BTC to the deposit address on Bitcoin

Configuration

.env file (only needed for auto mode with NEAR origin):

env
NEAR_ACCOUNT_ID=your-account.near
NEAR_PRIVATE_KEY=ed25519:your_private_key_here
NEAR_RPC_URL=https://rpc.mainnet.fastnear.com
NEAR_NETWORK_ID=mainnet
ONE_CLICK_JWT=optional_jwt_token
  • `ONE

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 375)May include surrounding context.

md
| `SKILL.md` | This file — **primary AI agent reference** |

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill documents an auto mode that can initiate a real on-chain transfer from a configured NEAR account, but the user-facing guidance around that mode does not prominently require explicit confirmation immediately before funds move. In an agent setting, this increases the risk of unintended irreversible transfers if a prompt, misunderstanding, or automation path triggers auto mode without a clear consent checkpoint.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The phrase and behavior 'Automatically sends the deposit from the configured NEAR account' indicates autonomous financial action by the agent. In the context of a wallet-enabled skill, autonomous execution is dangerous because LLMs can misinterpret instructions, be prompt-injected, or act on incomplete user intent, causing direct asset loss.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 138)May include surrounding context.

md
## Modes

### Auto Mode (default)
Automatically sends the deposit from the configured NEAR account.

**Use when**: Origin asset is on NEAR and agent has NEAR credentials in `.env`.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.