Skill flagged — suspicious patterns detected
ClawHub Security flagged this skill as suspicious. Review the scan results before using.
Openclaw Godmode Skill Repo
v5.11.3Self-orchestrating multi-agent development workflows. You say WHAT, the AI decides HOW.
⭐ 12· 4.4k·22 current·22 all-time
byTonyNoScope@cubetribe
MIT-0
Download zip
LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
OpenClaw
Suspicious
medium confidencePurpose & Capability
The skill's name and description (multi-agent orchestration for development workflows) match the SKILL.md and agent specs: agents run builds, tests, GitHub ops, web research, Playwright, etc. The requested runtime capabilities (shell, git, Playwright, GitHub/Claude credentials) are coherent with an orchestration/documentation skill of this type. However, registry-level requirement fields (top-level Requirements in the registry report) list no required binaries or env vars while the SKILL.md and clawdis.yaml explicitly declare runtime.requires_binaries/credentials/network — this metadata mismatch is notable.
Instruction Scope
SKILL.md instructs agents to run shell commands (bash, git, tsc, npm, gh, playwright), read/write/edit project files, call WebSearch/WebFetch, and interact with MCP/GitHub. Those actions are within the declared purpose (orchestration) but they grant broad runtime access to the filesystem, network, and developer tooling. The instructions do not appear to direct exfiltration to unknown endpoints; they reference standard tools and GitHub/Anthropic services only. Still, the workflow gives agents discretion to modify project files and run commands — so users should only enable it in environments where that is acceptable.
Install Mechanism
This is an instruction-only skill with no install-time executable payload or downloads. No install spec is present, which reduces install-time risk; all potentially-sensitive actions occur at agent runtime under user invocation.
Credentials
Registry metadata in the installer summary lists no required env vars or binaries, but SKILL.md and clawdis.yaml explicitly say runtime requires binaries (bash, git, grep, optional node/npm/gh/playwright) and credentials (optional GH_TOKEN, Claude/Anthropic auth, MCP auth). The skill will likely need GitHub and Claude credentials, and access to MCP server configs, which are sensitive. The mismatch between registry declarations and the skill's own runtime docs is an incoherence that increases risk: the installer view understates required privileges.
Persistence & Privilege
always:false and default autonomous invocation are set (normal). The skill does not request permanent system-wide privileges in its bundle, nor does it include install-time scripts that modify other skills. At runtime agents will write reports and may modify project files and push to GitHub (but SKILL.md explicitly states 'NEVER git push without permission'), so the main persistence/privilege concern is runtime scope, not installation-level persistence.
What to consider before installing
This skill is documentation-only and appears to be what it claims — an orchestrator for multi-agent development workflows — but there are important inconsistencies and runtime risks you should consider before enabling it:
- Metadata mismatch: The registry summary shows no required binaries or environment variables, yet the skill's own SKILL.md and clawdis.yaml state it requires shell tools, network access, and credentials (GH_TOKEN, Claude/Anthropic auth, MCP auth) at runtime. Treat the runtime declarations in SKILL.md/clawdis.yaml as authoritative and assume the skill will request these when invoked.
- What it can do at runtime: Agents are permitted to run bash/git/npm/tsc/playwright, read/write and edit project files, run tests, create GitHub issues/PRs, and fetch web content. That is appropriate for an orchestrator but gives broad powers — it can modify your repo and execute commands in the environment where your agent runs.
- Minimize risk before use: 1) Run the skill in a sandbox/container or on a forked repository first; 2) Provide least-privilege tokens (create a GitHub token with minimal scopes and avoid using a global admin token); 3) Do not supply your primary production credentials (MCP/Claude) until you’ve validated behavior; 4) Verify and/or pin MCP endpoints and check logs of any agent-run commands; 5) Confirm the skill's explicit rule 'NEVER git push without permission' is enforced by your own policies — do not rely on the skill to be well-behaved.
- Ask the publisher or maintainers to fix registry metadata so required runtime binaries/credentials are declared at install time (this mismatch is the main coherence issue). If you need higher assurance, request sample runs, agent message transcripts, or test in an isolated environment before granting any credentials.
Overall: the skill is plausible for its purpose but the metadata omission about runtime credentials/binaries is a red flag — proceed cautiously and with least-privilege controls.Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.
latestvk977fy63eqkdhpwxk9g0mfw8dx818ry0
License
MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Runtime requirements
🚀 Clawdis
