T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:47- Finding
Unverified Remote Installation Scripts Are Executed Directly
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill does what it says, but it includes unsafe install commands and can expose local services to the public internet without enough upfront guardrails.
Install only if you are comfortable reviewing and constraining the setup. Prefer a pinned package-manager install in an isolated environment, avoid the curl-to-bash or irm-to-iex installers, expose only APIs meant for external testing, do not tunnel SSH, databases, admin panels, or secret-bearing debug endpoints, and stop the tunnel when testing is done.
SKILL.md:47Unverified Remote Installation Scripts Are Executed Directly
SKILL.md:13AiTun Dependency Is Installed Without Version or Integrity Pinning
The skill recommends curl -fsSL https://aitun.cc/install.sh | bash, which executes a remote script directly from the network without inspection, signature verification, or integrity pinning. If the remote server, transport, or distribution pipeline is compromised, arbitrary code runs on the host immediately.
Or install via one-line script (Linux/macOS):
curl -fsSL https://aitun.cc/install.sh | bash
Windows (PowerShell):
The | bash construct chains network retrieval directly into command execution, eliminating any opportunity for review and making compromise of the remote content immediately exploitable. In an agent skill context, this is especially risky because automation may execute the command non-interactively with user privileges.
Or install via one-line script (Linux/macOS):
curl -fsSL https://aitun.cc/install.sh | bash
Windows (PowerShell):
The core workflow instructs the user to publish a local API to the public internet, but it does not present an upfront warning that this may expose private data, unauthenticated endpoints, debug routes, or internal-only services. In security terms, this is dangerous because the default action increases exposure before the user is prompted to consider authentication, authorization, rate limiting, and data sensitivity.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
The skill is positioned as exposing local HTTP APIs, but the CLI reference also documents generic TCP port forwarding for ports such as 22 or 3306. That materially expands the attack surface from web testing to exposing sensitive internal services to the public internet, and the skill does not prominently constrain or warn against risky uses.
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.