ClawHub
Back to skill

Security audit

Iot Bridge

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill does what it says, but it exposes local IoT services to the internet and includes risky one-line remote installer commands without enough safety framing.

Review this before installing. Prefer the pip or uv install path, avoid the one-line remote script commands unless you have independently verified the source, and do not expose Home Assistant, Node-RED, Grafana, MQTT, or device-control APIs unless they require strong authentication and you understand who can reach the tunnel URL.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The skill recommends one-line installation methods that fetch and immediately execute remote scripts (`curl ... | bash` and `irm ... | iex`) without any warning or verification guidance. This is dangerous because a compromised upstream server, DNS/TLS interception, or malicious script update would lead to arbitrary code execution on the user's machine.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The skill's core purpose is to expose local IoT services, dashboards, and brokers to the public internet, but the initial usage guidance does not prominently warn about unauthorized access, data exposure, or remote control risks. In the IoT context this is especially sensitive because exposed MQTT brokers, Home Assistant, Node-RED, or device APIs can permit surveillance, command execution, or manipulation of physical devices.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
## CLI Reference

The `aitun` command (installed via `pip install aitun`, or alternatively `curl -fsSL https://aitun.cc/install.sh | bash` / `irm https://aitun.cc/install.ps1 | iex` on Windows) accepts these flags:

| Flag | Description |
|---|---|
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
This is an explicit external script fetch-and-execute pattern in the CLI reference, instructing users to run a remote shell script directly from the network. That creates a direct arbitrary code execution path if the remote content is ever malicious, compromised, or tampered with, and the risk is heightened because the command is presented as normal usage documentation.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.