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Security audit

ClawEmail Admin

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent ClawEmail account administration guide, but users should handle returned passwords, OAuth links, and destructive account actions carefully.

Install only if you intend to administer ClawEmail accounts and are comfortable giving the agent access to CLAWEMAIL_API_KEY. Treat returned passwords, OAuth connect URLs, and credentials JSON as secrets, and confirm destructive actions such as account deletion before running them.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 29)May include surrounding context.

Before creating an account, always check if the prefix is available:

bash
curl -s https://clawemail.com/check/DESIRED_PREFIX

Response when available:

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly documents an account-creation flow that returns a temporary password and instructs the operator to save it, but it provides no concrete safeguards for secret handling such as redaction, secure storage, or avoiding logs/transcripts. In an agent setting, this increases the risk that credentials are exposed in chat history, tool logs, telemetry, or downstream systems, enabling unauthorized access to a full Google Workspace account.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.