Back to skill

Security audit

Skool All-in-One API

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is an openly documented Skool management integration, but it asks users to send Skool passwords and reusable session cookies to a third-party Apify actor that can perform high-impact community actions.

Install only if you are comfortable trusting the named Apify actor and your Apify account with Skool credentials, private community data, and admin-capable session cookies. Prefer a dedicated low-privilege Skool automation account, a least-privilege Apify token, and manual confirmation before any delete, ban, approve, reject, edit, or post action.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:84
Finding

Skool Credentials and Reusable Session Cookies Are Entrusted to a Third-Party Actor

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:84
Finding

Apify API Token Is Exposed in URL Query Strings

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:1
Finding

Unpinned npm CLI Dependency Creates a Supply-Chain Execution Risk

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (15)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 83)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Login and get cookies
export $(grep APIFY_TOKEN .env | xargs)
RESULT=$(curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/cristiantala~skool-all-in-one-api/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&waitForFinish=120" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 103)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Login and get cookies
export $(grep APIFY_TOKEN .env | xargs)
RESULT=$(curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/cristiantala~skool-all-in-one-api/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&waitForFinish=120" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

This section combines local secret loading with a flow that asks for and transmits the user's email and password to a third-party automation actor. While .env usage alone is benign, in this context the skill is facilitating collection and external transmission of primary credentials, which is a genuine high-risk auth pattern.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 117)May include surrounding context.

With email+password (slower, ~10s, uses Playwright):

bash
export $(grep APIFY_TOKEN .env | xargs)
curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/cristiantala~skool-all-in-one-api/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&waitForFinish=120" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises full read and write access, including destructive moderation and content actions, without any documented confirmation or approval gate. In an agent setting, that raises the risk of accidental bans, deletions, approvals, or posts triggered by ambiguous prompts or prompt-injection in surrounding context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The documented moderation workflows include approve, reject, ban, and delete-capable actions but provide no safeguards, rollback notes, or warnings about irreversible/high-impact outcomes. This makes misuse more likely in automated execution and increases operational and account-management risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly exposes a workflow to obtain and reuse Skool authentication cookies for about 3.5 days. Reusable session material is more sensitive than ordinary CRUD operations because anyone with the cookie can potentially act as the user without re-entering credentials, expanding the impact of leakage or misuse.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 84)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Login and get cookies
export $(grep APIFY_TOKEN .env | xargs)
RESULT=$(curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/cristiantala~skool-all-in-one-api/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&waitForFinish=120" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "action": "auth:login",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 84)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Login and get cookies
export $(grep APIFY_TOKEN .env | xargs)
RESULT=$(curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/cristiantala~skool-all-in-one-api/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&waitForFinish=120" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "action": "auth:login",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 133)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Login and get cookies
export $(grep APIFY_TOKEN .env | xargs)
RESULT=$(curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/cristiantala~skool-all-in-one-api/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&waitForFinish=120" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "action": "auth:login",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The workflow retrieves raw cookies from the actor-run dataset and stores them for reuse over multiple days. Returning session cookies in retrievable output creates a high-value secret exposure point: logs, datasets, downstream tools, or other users with access could replay the session and impersonate the account.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 94)May include surrounding context.

}')

RUN_ID=$(echo $RESULT | jq -r '.data.id') COOKIES=$(curl -s "https://api.apify.com/v2/actor-runs/$RUN_ID/dataset/items?token=$APIFY_TOKEN" | jq -r '.[0].cookies') echo "Cookies saved. Valid for ~3.5 days."

text

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This call pattern sends reusable cookies to a third-party execution environment to perform actions. Transmitting bearer-style session material off-platform broadens exposure and allows compromise of the Skool account if the transport destination, logs, or execution environment are abused.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 104)May include surrounding context.

bash
export $(grep APIFY_TOKEN .env | xargs)
curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/cristiantala~skool-all-in-one-api/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&waitForFinish=120" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "action": "ACTION_NAME",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This call pattern sends reusable cookies to a third-party execution environment to perform actions. Transmitting bearer-style session material off-platform broadens exposure and allows compromise of the Skool account if the transport destination, logs, or execution environment are abused.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 104)May include surrounding context.

bash
export $(grep APIFY_TOKEN .env | xargs)
curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/cristiantala~skool-all-in-one-api/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&waitForFinish=120" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "action": "ACTION_NAME",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The documented alternate flow transmits a user's email and password to the Apify actor for browser automation. Sending primary credentials to a third-party automation service materially increases the blast radius of compromise and may violate least-privilege expectations for a community-management skill.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 118)May include surrounding context.

bash
export $(grep APIFY_TOKEN .env | xargs)
curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/cristiantala~skool-all-in-one-api/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&waitForFinish=120" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "action": "ACTION_NAME",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The documented alternate flow transmits a user's email and password to the Apify actor for browser automation. Sending primary credentials to a third-party automation service materially increases the blast radius of compromise and may violate least-privilege expectations for a community-management skill.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 118)May include surrounding context.

bash
export $(grep APIFY_TOKEN .env | xargs)
curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/cristiantala~skool-all-in-one-api/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&waitForFinish=120" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "action": "ACTION_NAME",

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The manifest/skill description says the skill is for community management, but the body also documents an authentication flow that logs in and extracts reusable session cookies valid for several days. That broader capability materially changes the trust boundary because it enables session acquisition and replay, not just point-in-time management actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.