T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:84- Finding
Skool Credentials and Reusable Session Cookies Are Entrusted to a Third-Party Actor
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is an openly documented Skool management integration, but it asks users to send Skool passwords and reusable session cookies to a third-party Apify actor that can perform high-impact community actions.
Install only if you are comfortable trusting the named Apify actor and your Apify account with Skool credentials, private community data, and admin-capable session cookies. Prefer a dedicated low-privilege Skool automation account, a least-privilege Apify token, and manual confirmation before any delete, ban, approve, reject, edit, or post action.
SKILL.md:84Skool Credentials and Reusable Session Cookies Are Entrusted to a Third-Party Actor
SKILL.md:84Apify API Token Is Exposed in URL Query Strings
SKILL.md:1Unpinned npm CLI Dependency Creates a Supply-Chain Execution Risk
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
# Login and get cookies
export $(grep APIFY_TOKEN .env | xargs)
RESULT=$(curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/cristiantala~skool-all-in-one-api/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&waitForFinish=120" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
# Login and get cookies
export $(grep APIFY_TOKEN .env | xargs)
RESULT=$(curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/cristiantala~skool-all-in-one-api/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&waitForFinish=120" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
This section combines local secret loading with a flow that asks for and transmits the user's email and password to a third-party automation actor. While .env usage alone is benign, in this context the skill is facilitating collection and external transmission of primary credentials, which is a genuine high-risk auth pattern.
With email+password (slower, ~10s, uses Playwright):
export $(grep APIFY_TOKEN .env | xargs)
curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/cristiantala~skool-all-in-one-api/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&waitForFinish=120" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
The skill advertises full read and write access, including destructive moderation and content actions, without any documented confirmation or approval gate. In an agent setting, that raises the risk of accidental bans, deletions, approvals, or posts triggered by ambiguous prompts or prompt-injection in surrounding context.
The documented moderation workflows include approve, reject, ban, and delete-capable actions but provide no safeguards, rollback notes, or warnings about irreversible/high-impact outcomes. This makes misuse more likely in automated execution and increases operational and account-management risk.
The skill explicitly exposes a workflow to obtain and reuse Skool authentication cookies for about 3.5 days. Reusable session material is more sensitive than ordinary CRUD operations because anyone with the cookie can potentially act as the user without re-entering credentials, expanding the impact of leakage or misuse.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# Login and get cookies
export $(grep APIFY_TOKEN .env | xargs)
RESULT=$(curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/cristiantala~skool-all-in-one-api/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&waitForFinish=120" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"action": "auth:login",
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# Login and get cookies
export $(grep APIFY_TOKEN .env | xargs)
RESULT=$(curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/cristiantala~skool-all-in-one-api/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&waitForFinish=120" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"action": "auth:login",
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# Login and get cookies
export $(grep APIFY_TOKEN .env | xargs)
RESULT=$(curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/cristiantala~skool-all-in-one-api/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&waitForFinish=120" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"action": "auth:login",
The workflow retrieves raw cookies from the actor-run dataset and stores them for reuse over multiple days. Returning session cookies in retrievable output creates a high-value secret exposure point: logs, datasets, downstream tools, or other users with access could replay the session and impersonate the account.
}')
RUN_ID=$(echo $RESULT | jq -r '.data.id') COOKIES=$(curl -s "https://api.apify.com/v2/actor-runs/$RUN_ID/dataset/items?token=$APIFY_TOKEN" | jq -r '.[0].cookies') echo "Cookies saved. Valid for ~3.5 days."
This call pattern sends reusable cookies to a third-party execution environment to perform actions. Transmitting bearer-style session material off-platform broadens exposure and allows compromise of the Skool account if the transport destination, logs, or execution environment are abused.
export $(grep APIFY_TOKEN .env | xargs)
curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/cristiantala~skool-all-in-one-api/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&waitForFinish=120" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"action": "ACTION_NAME",
This call pattern sends reusable cookies to a third-party execution environment to perform actions. Transmitting bearer-style session material off-platform broadens exposure and allows compromise of the Skool account if the transport destination, logs, or execution environment are abused.
export $(grep APIFY_TOKEN .env | xargs)
curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/cristiantala~skool-all-in-one-api/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&waitForFinish=120" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"action": "ACTION_NAME",
The documented alternate flow transmits a user's email and password to the Apify actor for browser automation. Sending primary credentials to a third-party automation service materially increases the blast radius of compromise and may violate least-privilege expectations for a community-management skill.
export $(grep APIFY_TOKEN .env | xargs)
curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/cristiantala~skool-all-in-one-api/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&waitForFinish=120" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"action": "ACTION_NAME",
The documented alternate flow transmits a user's email and password to the Apify actor for browser automation. Sending primary credentials to a third-party automation service materially increases the blast radius of compromise and may violate least-privilege expectations for a community-management skill.
export $(grep APIFY_TOKEN .env | xargs)
curl -s -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/cristiantala~skool-all-in-one-api/runs?token=$APIFY_TOKEN&waitForFinish=120" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"action": "ACTION_NAME",
The manifest/skill description says the skill is for community management, but the body also documents an authentication flow that logs in and extracts reusable session cookies valid for several days. That broader capability materially changes the trust boundary because it enables session acquisition and replay, not just point-in-time management actions.