T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
scripts/generate_image.py:2- Finding
Unpinned Runtime Dependencies Permit Unreviewed Package Updates
- Content
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=3.10" # dependencies = [ # "google-genai>=1.0.0", # "pillow>=10.0.0", # ] # /// ``` ### Technical Analysis The inline dependency specification uses unrestricted lower-bound version constraints for `google-genai` and `pillow`. No exact versions, upper bounds, integrity hashes, or reviewed lockfile are present. When the documented `uv run` workflow resolves these requirements, it may install future package versions that did not exist when the Skill was audited. Because imported Python packages execute code within the current process, a compromised or malicious package release could execute with the same operating-system privileges as the user running the Skill. This finding concerns mutable dependency resolution. The reviewed project does not itself contain evidence that the named packages are currently malicious. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises a maintainer account, distribution pipeline, or permitted future release of one of the dependencies. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious package version that satisfies `google-genai>=1.0.0` or `pillow>=10.0.0`. 3. A user invokes the Skill through the documented `uv run` command. 4. The resolver selects and installs the malicious but version-compatible release. 5. The package executes during import or normal API use inside `generate_image.py`. 6. The malicious dependency gains access to the process environment, user-readable files, prompts, input images, and Gemini credentials available to the process. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation would provide code execution with the privileges of the user running the Skill. The accessible scope could include: - The `GEMINI_API_KEY` environment variable or command-line credential. - Prompts and i ...[truncated 320 chars]- Remediation
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", # "pillow==", # ] ``` 2. Generate and commit a lockfile that records all transitive dependency versions. 3. Enforce package integrity hashes where the selected package-management workflow supports them. 4. Use only trusted package indexes and explicitly configure the index rather than inheriting an uncontrolled source. 5. Review dependency changes before updating the pins or lockfile. 6. Add automated vulnerability and provenance scanning to the release process. 7. Run image generation in a restricted environment with minimal filesystem access and only the required network destination. ]]>