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Security audit

BaseAlpha Onboard & Launch

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is purpose-aligned for BaseAlpha onboarding and token launch, but it asks an unpinned runtime package to handle a live private key for irreversible blockchain actions.

Review this before installing. Use only a dedicated low-value wallet, pin or verify the MCP package before giving it BASEALPHA_PRIVATE_KEY, expect real Base transactions that may spend gas, and confirm that the BaseAlpha/Supabase endpoints are the endpoints you intend to trust.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (4)

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs users to execute an unpinned package via `npx @basealpha/mcp`, which fetches the latest published code at runtime. In a workflow that also supplies a live private key through environment variables, a compromised upstream package, typosquat, or malicious update could immediately exfiltrate secrets or submit unauthorized on-chain transactions.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The one-shot onboarding flow describes `apply → claim → prepare → sign → send → register` but does not prominently warn that this will perform real blockchain transactions using the provided private key. In this context, omission is dangerous because operators may treat the skill as routine setup rather than a live token launch with irreversible financial effects.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The raw HTTP section instructs users to submit wallet identity data, signed claim material, and launch-related payloads to external Supabase endpoints without a clear warning about data transmission and trust boundaries. In a security-sensitive onboarding and launch flow, that omission can lead users to expose sensitive metadata or signed artifacts without understanding they are being sent off-host to third-party infrastructure.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```bash
# 1) Apply (no API key)
curl -X POST "$API/v1/agents/apply" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"wallet":"0x…","agentName":"fleet-bot","runtimeTag":"openclaw","metadataUrl":"https://…","description":"…"}'
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.