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Security audit

Wikclawpedia Archive Access

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Wikclawpedia API helper, with a disclosed submit feature that sends user-provided wiki intel to an external service.

Install only if you are comfortable with queries and submissions going to wikclawpedia.com. Do not submit secrets, personal data, internal URLs, proprietary notes, or anything you would not want reviewed or published.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (4)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 73)May include surrounding context.

Example:

bash
curl "https://wikclawpedia.com/api/search?q=openclaw&limit=5"

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill encourages submitting user-provided intel to an external service but does not clearly warn that submitted content, attribution, URLs, and other metadata will be transmitted off-platform and retained for review/publication. This creates a real privacy and data-handling risk because agents may forward sensitive workspace data, internal URLs, tokens accidentally embedded in payloads, or identifying information without informed consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The submit() function transmits caller-provided intel to an external domain with no built-in consent, disclosure, or guardrails around what data may be sent. In an agent-skill context, this can cause unreviewed exfiltration of user, workspace, or model-derived sensitive information if upstream code passes collected context into submit().

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The manifest exposes a write-capable submit function that sends user-provided content to a public external API, but it gives no warning that submitted data leaves the local agent context and may be stored, reviewed, published, or attributed. This creates a real privacy and data-handling risk because an agent or user could inadvertently transmit sensitive prompts, personal data, internal notes, or proprietary information to a third party.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.