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Security audit

Aarondb

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent database helper skill, with the main caution that it installs an unpinned external npm package.

Before installing, pin and review the npm package version, preferably install it in a least-privileged environment, and be deliberate about what facts you persist or synchronize across agents.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:22
Finding
Unpinned Third-Party npm Dependency Installation## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 22-28 **Vulnerability Type**: Supply-chain risk from an unpinned third-party dependency **Risk Level**: Medium The installation documentation directs users to install a third-party npm package without specifying an exact version or providing a lockfile or integrity verification: ```markdown ## Installation To use this skill, ensure the core package is installed in your agent's runtime: ```bash npm install @criticalinsight/aarondb-edge ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis Running `npm install @criticalinsight/aarondb-edge` without an exact version resolves a package version according to the npm registry's current metadata. Consequently, the code installed in the future may differ from the code that existed when this Skill was reviewed. npm packages can also define lifecycle scripts that execute during installation. If the publisher account, package, registry path, or a transitive dependency is compromised, a malicious release may execute code with the privileges of the user or service performing the installation. The project provides no lockfile, package integrity hash, vendored implementation, or provenance-verification procedure to constrain or authenticate the installed artifact. The audit did not establish that the referenced package is currently malicious. The confirmed issue is that the documented installation process does not ensure that users receive a specific reviewed artifact. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the package publisher, publication credentials, registry entry, or a dependency used by the package. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious or otherwise compromised package release. 3. A user follows the documented unpinned `npm install` command. 4. npm resolves and downloads the attacker-controlled release or affected dependency. 5. Malicious package code may execute through an installation lifecycle script or when the agent import ...[truncated 834 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Replace the floating installation command with an exact, audited version, for example: ```bash npm install --save-exact @criticalinsight/aarondb-edge@1.1.0 ``` 2. Verify that the pinned package version corresponds to the version declared in the Skill metadata and review the published artifact before recommending it. 3. Provide and commit a lockfile containing npm integrity metadata, and instruct automated deployments to use `npm ci` rather than unconstrained `npm install`. 4. Enable npm package provenance verification where available and document the expected publisher, registry, version, and artifact identity. 5. Audit direct and transitive dependencies using appropriate supply-chain and vulnerability-scanning tools. 6. Review package lifecycle scripts. Where compatible with the package, install with lifecycle scripts disabled: ```bash npm ci --ignore-scripts ``` 7. Perform dependency installation and execution in a least-privileged, isolated environment without unnecessary credentials, filesystem access, or network permissions. 8. Establish a controlled dependency-update process so that new releases are reviewed and tested before the pinned version and lockfile are updated.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.