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Security audit

Context Onboarding

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill coherently provides a local read-only onboarding summary of workspace context files, with no evidence of hidden execution, exfiltration, destructive behavior, or persistence.

Before installing, understand that running the CLI will print snippets from local files you point it at. Use it for intended workspace onboarding docs and avoid passing sensitive files or unrelated directories through --files or --workspace.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding
The skill advertises and operationalizes code-backed behavior, including reading workspace files and supporting a user-controlled workspace path, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permissions. That omission weakens policy enforcement and user visibility into what the skill may access, increasing the risk of unintended file access or broader shell/file operations than expected.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Content
def run_workspace(args, workspace):
    return subprocess.run(
        [sys.executable, str(SCRIPT_PATH)] + args,
        capture_output=True,
        text=True,
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.