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Security audit

threads-research

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly matches its stated Threads research purpose, but its authenticated helper is broader than the documented read-only API catalog.

Install only if you are comfortable giving this helper your Crawlora API key and having requests sent to Crawlora. Before regular use, the publisher should narrow the helper to GET only and enforce exact endpoint shapes so authenticated calls cannot drift outside the documented Threads research catalog.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/crawlora.sh:43
Finding
Overbroad Route and HTTP Method Allowlist Permits Undocumented Authenticated API Requests## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/crawlora.sh`, lines 43–67 **Vulnerability Type**: Overbroad route and HTTP method validation **Risk Level**: Medium ```bash case "$method" in GET|POST) ;; *) echo "only GET and POST are supported by the threads-research skill" >&2 exit 2 ;; esac # Reject path syntax that could smuggle a route through a shell glob check. case "$path" in ""|*[?#%]*|*..*|*//* ) echo "invalid path for the threads-research skill" >&2 exit 2 ;; esac case "$path" in /threads/post/*/*) ;; /threads/post/*/*/replies) ;; /threads/profile/*) ;; /threads/profile/*/posts) ;; /threads/search) ;; *) echo "path is not in the threads-research skill catalog" >&2 exit 2 ;; esac ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented skill catalog contains five read-only `GET` endpoints. However, the helper accepts both `GET` and `POST`, allowing authenticated POST requests even though no POST endpoint is documented for this skill. The path allowlist also uses unanchored Bash `case` glob patterns. In Bash, `*` can match slash characters, so patterns such as `/threads/profile/*` and `/threads/post/*/*` do not enforce the expected number of path segments. For example, the profile pattern can accept paths containing additional segments after a username. The broad patterns also appear before the more specific `posts` and `replies` patterns, causing valid specific paths to match the broader rules first. Consequently, the validation does not reliably restrict requests to the five documented endpoint shapes. Any accepted request is subsequently sent to the fixed Crawlora API origin with the user's `CRAWLORA_API_KEY`. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker or untrusted caller controls the arguments passed to `scripts/crawlora.sh`. 2. The caller supplies an undocumented path under an accepted prefix, such as `/threads/profile/user/posts/extra`, ...[truncated 1155 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions - Restrict this skill to `GET` requests because every documented Threads endpoint is read-only. Remove POST handling from the method allowlist. - Replace broad shell globs with anchored validation that enforces exact path shapes and segment counts. - Define separate validations for: - `/threads/profile/{username}` - `/threads/profile/{username}/posts` - `/threads/post/{username}/{code}` - `/threads/post/{username}/{code}/replies` - `/threads/search` - Restrict `username` and `code` to explicitly approved character sets and reject empty segments, slashes, control characters, and URL-encoded delimiters. - Evaluate specific routes before broader alternatives if glob matching is retained, although anchored regular expressions are preferable. - Add negative tests covering POST and other non-GET methods, extra path segments, missing segments, encoded separators, traversal syntax, query fragments in paths, and undocumented route suffixes. - Preserve the existing fixed HTTPS origin and temporary credential-file protections.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (8)

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly instructs use of a shell helper script but does not declare any tool restrictions such as allowed-tools or permissions. That creates an overbroad execution surface where an agent may invoke shell access without an explicit least-privilege boundary, increasing the risk of unintended command execution or misuse if the skill is composed with untrusted inputs.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Crawlora REST helper — minimal, dependency-free (curl only).
# Calls https://api.crawlora.net/api/v1 with your Crawlora API key.
# Get a free key (2,000 credits/mo, no card) at https://crawlora.net?utm_source=github&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=crawlora-skills.
#
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Crawlora REST helper — minimal, dependency-free (curl only).
# Calls https://api.crawlora.net/api/v1 with your Crawlora API key.
# Get a free key (2,000 credits/mo, no card) at https://crawlora.net?utm_source=github&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=crawlora-skills.
#
# Usage:
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Crawlora REST helper — minimal, dependency-free (curl only).
# Calls https://api.crawlora.net/api/v1 with your Crawlora API key.
# Get a free key (2,000 credits/mo, no card) at https://crawlora.net?utm_source=github&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=crawlora-skills.
#
# Usage:
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Crawlora REST helper — minimal, dependency-free (curl only).
# Calls https://api.crawlora.net/api/v1 with your Crawlora API key.
# Get a free key (2,000 credits/mo, no card) at https://crawlora.net?utm_source=github&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=crawlora-skills.
#
# Usage:
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Crawlora REST helper — minimal, dependency-free (curl only).
# Calls https://api.crawlora.net/api/v1 with your Crawlora API key.
# Get a free key (2,000 credits/mo, no card) at https://crawlora.net?utm_source=github&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=crawlora-skills.
#
# Usage:
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
# Keep the API key out of the curl process command line. A private temporary
# config supplies the header and is removed automatically on exit.
curl_config="$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/crawlora-curl.XXXXXX")"
chmod 600 "$curl_config"
trap 'rm -f "$curl_config"' EXIT
printf 'header = "x-api-key: %s"\n' "$CRAWLORA_API_KEY" >"$curl_config"
auth=(--config "$curl_config")
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
[ -n "$body" ] || body='{}'
  # Stream the body on stdin so curl never interprets a user value as its
  # @file shorthand (and cannot read local files supplied in a request body).
  printf '%s' "$body" | curl -fsS -X "$method" "${auth[@]}" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" --data-binary @- "${base}${path}"
fi
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.