Security audit

data-audit

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a local data-audit utility whose file scanning, report writing, and local history log match its stated purpose.

Before installing, understand that snapshots and reports may contain file names, paths, metadata, and hashes from the directories you choose, and the log feature stores your action text and targets locally in ~/.data-audit-logs. Avoid running it on sensitive directories unless those local artifacts are acceptable, and clear the log directory if you no longer want that history retained.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (5)

Tp4

High

Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence: 77% confidence
Finding: The documented behavior omits several capabilities the analyzer believes exist, including config loading, ignore-file processing, filtering, and alternate export paths. Undocumented input sources and output modes increase attack surface because users and reviewers may not realize the skill can read extra local files or write additional report formats, which weakens consent and reviewability.

Session Persistence

Medium

Category: Rogue Agent
Content: |----------|---------|-------|--------|---------|------------| | `--snapshot` | 目录快照 | Path | stdout/JSON/CSV | No | Read only | | `--compare` | 快照对比 | JSON files | stdout/JSON/CSV | No | Read only | | `--log` | 操作记录 | Action text | Log file | No | Write ~/.data-audit-logs | | `--history` | 历史查询 | None | stdout | No | Read ~/.data-audit-logs | | `--validate` | 健康检查 | Path | stdout/JSON/CSV | No | Read only |
Confidence: 82% confidence
Finding: The skill explicitly documents persistent local logging to ~/.data-audit-logs, which creates session persistence on disk. In an audit tool this is contextually expected, but it can still expose sensitive operational metadata (action descriptions, target paths, timestamps) to other local users, backups, or later processes if retention and permissions are not controlled.

Session Persistence

Medium

Category: Rogue Agent
Content: - ❌ No dynamic imports from external sources - ❌ No system commands via subprocess/shell - ❌ No telemetry, analytics, or usage reporting - ❌ No modification of user files (logs only write to ~/.data-audit-logs) ### Data Privacy - All processing is local — no data leaves the machine
Confidence: 80% confidence
Finding: This repeated statement confirms the tool writes persistent data to ~/.data-audit-logs, reinforcing that user activity is retained across sessions. Although the stated functionality is legitimate for an audit tracker, the persistence can still leak sensitive file paths or operational notes if not adequately consented to and protected.

Session Persistence

Medium

Category: Rogue Agent
Content: |----------|---------|-------|--------|---------|------------| | `--snapshot` | 目录快照 | Path | stdout/JSON | No | Read only | | `--compare` | 快照对比 | JSON files | stdout/JSON | No | Read only | | `--log` | 操作记录 | Action text | Log file | No | Write ~/.data-audit-logs | | `--history` | 历史查询 | None | stdout | No | Read ~/.data-audit-logs | | `--validate` | 健康检查 | Path | stdout/JSON | No | Read only |
Confidence: 83% confidence
Finding: The skill persists operation history to ~/.data-audit-logs, which creates a local audit trail containing action text and likely target paths. Persistent logs can expose sensitive filenames, project structure, business operations, or user-entered notes to other local users, backups, or later processes if retention and permissions are not tightly controlled.

Session Persistence

Medium

Category: Rogue Agent
Content: - ❌ No dynamic imports from external sources - ❌ No system commands via subprocess/shell - ❌ No telemetry, analytics, or usage reporting - ❌ No modification of user files (logs only write to ~/.data-audit-logs) ### Data Privacy - All processing is local — no data leaves the machine
Confidence: 81% confidence
Finding: The privacy section confirms continued local storage of log history, reinforcing that session data survives beyond a single run. Even without network exfiltration, persistent storage can become a confidentiality issue when logs contain operational context or sensitive paths and are retained indefinitely.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.