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Security audit

attribution

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a marketing attribution guidance skill with disclosed, purpose-aligned analytics identity-stitching advice and no executable install or persistence behavior.

Installers should treat this as attribution implementation guidance, not a turnkey compliance plan. Before using the first-party tracking pattern, confirm user consent requirements, privacy notice coverage, retention limits, vendor agreements, and that only anonymous IDs are sent through third-party URLs.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/measurement-paradigms.md (reported line 24)May include surrounding context.

md
**Where it shines:** day-to-day, tactical decisions. "Is this campaign showing up on converting journeys?" Fast, granular, cheap if your tracking exists.

**Why it's structurally weakening:** MTA depends on tracking one person across touches and devices, and that data keeps eroding — Safari/Firefox ITP-style cookie limits, iOS ATT, browser consent gating, ad blockers, and ordinary cross-device behavior (research on mobile, buy on desktop). (Chrome's third-party-cookie deprecation was announced, then walked back, so "cookies are going away" is no longer the clean story — but everything else on that list already limits user-level tracking today.) MTA doesn't announce the gap: it silently under-measures anything it can't follow (dumping it into direct) and over-measures what it *can* see. So treat MTA as **incomplete and directionally biased** — not a clean lower bound (its retargeting/branded numbers are often *over*-stated) — and never the sole basis for a big reallocation.

**Use it for:** ongoing optimization and trend-watching — never as the sole basis for a big budget reallocation.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The runbook explicitly instructs sending an anonymous analytics identifier through third-party booking URLs and then merging it with a normalized email address in webhook-driven analytics ingestion. Even though the document includes some privacy-minded guardrails and warns against leaking identified IDs, it still describes cross-system identity linkage and transmission of identifiers without any user-consent, notice, retention, or lawful-basis guidance, which can create privacy/compliance risk and broaden tracking beyond user expectations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.