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Security audit

Openforge

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

OpenForge is a coherent PRD automation skill, but it needs review because it can spawn agents, change workspace files, and run PRD-supplied shell commands with weak execution boundaries.

Install only if you intend to run trusted PRDs in a controlled workspace. Review every Gate and Shell-Gate entry before running, prefer dry-run first, avoid secrets in PRDs, and use a disposable branch or sandbox for work you cannot afford to have modified or deleted.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:45
Finding

Insufficient Gate Command Validation Permits Arbitrary Command Execution

Content
View full analysis
`, `<`) unless the PRD explicitly marks the phase with `Shell-Gate: true`. Gates that fail this check are rejected with an error. Review all gate commands in your PRD before execution. ``` ```markdown | `Shell-Gate:` | No | `true` | Allow shell metacharacters in gate command (use only for trusted, reviewed gates) | ``` ```markdown 1. If a gate command is specified: - **Validate the gate command first.** Reject commands containing shell metacharacters (`;`, `&&`, `||`, `|`, `$(`, `` ` ``, `>`, `<`) unless the phase includes `Shell-Gate: true`. This prevents accidental or malicious arbitrary shell execution from PRD content. - Run the validated gate command with `exec` ``` ```markdown - Sub-agents run with the same permissions as the parent agent within the workspace directory - Gate commands are run with `exec` in the working directory. Review gate commands before running against production systems. Avoid destructive commands (e.g., `rm -rf`). ``` ### Technical Analysis OpenForge treats a PRD-provided `Gate:` value as a command and executes it through `exec`. Its primary protection is a blocklist of selected shell metacharacters. This does not constrain which executable may be invoked or which arguments may be supplied. Dangerous commands do not necessarily require any blocked characters. For example, destructive utilities, environment-i ...[truncated 2577 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The manifest description says OpenForge performs 'learning accumulation,' implying stateful retention across runs. However, the changelog explicitly says the learning accumulation feature was removed in v2 because persistent storage is not available, indicating current behavior does not match the claimed capability.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

L305 states 'No other writes are made by the orchestrator itself,' but the documented execution flow repeatedly instructs spawned agents to 'write code, files, configs' and to modify files relevant to their tasks. This creates an intent mismatch in the security description because the skill as a whole is presented as only writing a run artifact while its prescribed behavior is to cause broader workspace modifications.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrases are very broad and can activate execution from simple natural-language requests such as 'Run this PRD' or 'Run only the implement phase,' without embedding a strong confirmation or trust boundary. In this skill, activation leads to parsing PRD content, spawning sub-agents, modifying workspace files, and potentially executing gate commands, so accidental or socially engineered invocation materially increases risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The changelog explicitly states the skill can use native tools including exec, read, and write, which enable shell execution and filesystem modification, but it does not pair these capabilities with a clear user-facing warning about system-changing behavior. In this skill context, that is more dangerous because OpenForge is designed to orchestrate staged execution automatically and in parallel, increasing the chance that users invoke workspace-modifying actions without appreciating the scope of impact.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.