T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/submit_xai_tts_1.sh:14- Finding
API Key Exposure Through Process Arguments
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/submit_xai_tts_1.sh, line 14
Vulnerability Type: Bearer token disclosure through command-line arguments
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code:
bash curl --fail-with-body --request POST \ --url "https://api.poyo.ai/api/generate/submit" \ --header "Authorization: Bearer ${POYO_API_KEY}" \ --header "Content-Type: application/json" \ --data @"${payload_file}"Technical Analysis
The shell expands
${POYO_API_KEY}before startingcurl, placing the completeAuthorizationheader in the process argument vector. Depending on operating-system process visibility, container configuration, monitoring software, and diagnostic collection, another local user or service may be able to inspect the command line while the request is running.This is not evidence of deliberate credential exfiltration: the credential is sent only to the documented PoYo HTTPS endpoint. Nevertheless, passing secrets as command-line arguments unnecessarily increases their local exposure.
Attack Path
- An attacker first obtains access to a local account, monitoring service, container namespace, or diagnostic facility that can inspect the script's processes.
- The legitimate user invokes the submission script while
POYO_API_KEYcontains a valid credential. - The shell expands the environment variable into
curl's--headerargument. - During the lifetime of the
curlprocess, the attacker or monitoring facility captures its argument vector. - The attacker extracts the bearer token from the captured authorization header.
- The attacker reuses the token to submit requests to the PoYo API until the credential is revoked or expires.
Exploitation requires local process-inspection capability and timing or process monitoring; the script does not transmit the key to an undeclared third party.
Impact Assessment
A recovered API key could grant the attacker ...[truncated 329 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
Avoid including the bearer token directly in
curl's command-line argument vector. Supply sensitive curl configuration through standard input, for example:bash printf 'header = "Authorization: Bearer %s"\n' "$POYO_API_KEY" | curl --fail-with-body \ --config - \ --request POST \ --url "https://api.poyo.ai/api/generate/submit" \ --header "Content-Type: application/json" \ --data @"${payload_file}"Additionally:
- Run the script only in a trusted server-side environment with restricted process visibility.
- Ensure tracing modes such as
set -xare never enabled around credential handling. - Prevent command lines and authorization headers from being captured by logs, telemetry, crash reports, or job runners.
- Keep
POYO_API_KEYin a suitably protected secret manager or environment injection mechanism. - Apply least privilege and usage restrictions to the API key where supported.
- Rotate the key if process arguments may previously have been collected by untrusted users or monitoring systems.