T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/submit_kling_2_6.sh:11- Finding
PoYo API Key Exposed Through Process Command-Line Arguments
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/submit_kling_2_6.sh, lines 11-17
Vulnerability Type: Bearer token exposure through process arguments
Risk Level: Mediumbash payload_file="$1" curl --fail-with-body --request POST \ --url "https://api.poyo.ai/api/generate/submit" \ --header "Authorization: Bearer ${POYO_API_KEY}" \ --header "Content-Type: application/json" \ --data @"${payload_file}"Technical Analysis
The shell expands
${POYO_API_KEY}before executingcurl, placing the complete bearer token in the process argument vector. While the request is transmitted over HTTPS, this does not protect the secret from local process inspection.Depending on operating-system process visibility and isolation settings, another local user or process may observe the argument through facilities such as
/proc/<pid>/cmdline, process-monitoring utilities, diagnostic tooling, audit logs, or process telemetry. The exposure exists for the lifetime of thecurlprocess and may persist longer if process arguments are recorded.Attack Path
- An authorized user invokes
scripts/submit_kling_2_6.shwithPOYO_API_KEYset. - The shell expands the environment variable into the
--headerargument. - An attacker with sufficient local process-observation access monitors newly created processes or repeatedly reads process metadata.
- The attacker captures the argument containing
Authorization: Bearer <secret>. - The attacker reuses the recovered token to authenticate directly to PoYo APIs until the credential is revoked or expires.
Exploitation requires local process-inspection access or access to telemetry that records command-line arguments. Systems configured to restrict process visibility may reduce, but do not eliminate, the underlying exposure.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation discloses the
POYO_API_KEY. The attacker obtains the API permissions ...[truncated 321 chars]- An authorized user invokes
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
Avoid placing the bearer token directly in
curlcommand-line arguments.- Pass sensitive curl configuration through standard input, ensuring the secret does not appear in the process argument vector.
- Alternatively, use a temporary curl configuration file created with owner-only permissions, delete it reliably with a shell
trap, and ensure it is stored on a trusted filesystem. - Disable verbose shell tracing around secret handling and ensure monitoring or audit systems do not record authorization headers.
- Run the helper in an environment with restricted process visibility and least-privilege local access.
- Rotate
POYO_API_KEYif command-line arguments may already have been captured. - Prefer a narrowly scoped, short-lived API credential where the provider supports one.
One possible hardening pattern is to provide curl configuration through standard input while exposing only
/dev/stdinin the process arguments:bash { printf 'header = "Authorization: Bearer %s"\n' "${POYO_API_KEY}" printf 'header = "Content-Type: application/json"\n' } | curl --fail-with-body \ --request POST \ --url "https://api.poyo.ai/api/generate/submit" \ --config /dev/stdin \ --data @"${payload_file}"Confirm that the target platform does not log curl configuration supplied through standard input.